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STRANGE BEDFELLOWS FOR ELECTRONIC FUNDS
TRANSFERS: PROPOSED ARTICLE 4A OF THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE AND THE UNCITRAL
MODEL LAW
Carl Felsenfeld*
I. INTRODUCTION
Two pieces of proposed legislation that will affect the same
subject matter are proceeding down parallel tracks. If all goes as
planned, the tracks will at some time turn inward and there may
be a collision.
Each piece has as its core concern the subject of electronic
funds transfers ("EFTs"), the modern device that has overtaken
checks as the principal form of money transfer.' Basically, how-
ever, before the promulgation of Article 4A there was no
legislation, either in the United States or abroad, that governed
EFTs in the way that Articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Commercial
Code ("U.C.C.") govern check transfers in the United States and
that the Geneva Convention Providing a Uniform Law for Che-
ques' governs checks in Europe.3 The vacuum creates untold risks
* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.
1. Electronic payments commonly exceed $1 trillion per day in the United States
alone. Brandel & Davenport, Modernizing U.S. Payment Systems Law, 9 Bus. LAW UPDATE
1, 2 (No. 5 (1989)). This is over one hundred times the amount transmitted by check. While
the number of checks continues to rise, at least one observer expects that volume to begin
diminishing soon. Kantrow, Check Volume Expected to Peak in 1992, Am. Banker, Feb. 22,
1989, at 2, col. 1.
2. Convention providing a Uniform Law for Cheques with Annexes and Protocol,
March 19, 1931, 143 L.N.T.S. 355; see Note, Forged Indorsements Under the UNCITRAL
Draft Convention on International Cheques, 21 COLUM. J. OF TRANSNAT'L L. 585 (1983) (au-
thored by Donald J. Guiney) (The Geneva Convention binds only those states that have
adopted it.).
3. This is not to say that there is no governing law throughout the world. Spots of
applicable legislation appear in a number of the United States and in our federal law. Some
European states, particularly France and Germany, may be even more advanced in regulat-
ing electronic payments, particularly among banks. Such legislation, regulation, cases and
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to both banks and the users of the various systems; consequently,
two drafting bodies have taken action to fill the vacuum and sup-
ply the needed legislation.
On the domestic front, the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL") has drafted a
proposed Article 4A to the U C.C. titled Funds Transfers. It was
approved by the American Law Institute ("ALI") on May 19, 1989,
at its annual meeting and subsequently became a Uniform Law
upon adoption by the NCCUSL at its annual meeting on August 3,
1989.4
Internationally, the United Nations Commission on Interna-
tional Trade Law ("UNCITRAL") has taken pen in hand and
produced a draft Model Law on International Credit Transfers.
(The draft to which we shall refer here is dated September 18,
1989.)' It should be immediately observed that, while the NC-
CUSL and ALI have completed their work, UNCITRAL has not.
Meetings continue on the Model Law and one cannot anticipate
when the United Nations will give the product its imprimatur6 or
even what form that product will take.7
Although entitled "Model Law," the future evolution of the
UNCITRAL drafts is unclear. The present intent is that the prod-
uct will be designed for adoption by the participating states as the
domestic law of each adopting state-albeit designed to cover only
international transfers. One may, however, fairly accept this posi-
tion as tentative. In one way or another, possibly even through
custom as exist, however, tend to be directed to various specific practices and came into
existence only when a particular need was identified.
4. Actually, the draft submitted to and approved by the Conference was not precisely
the same as the draft previously approved by the ALI. When the ALI ratified 4A, it realized
that some technical changes might still be made and provided for this in connection with its
approval. When later reviewed by the ALI, the changes were deemed by it to be sufficiently
insignificant so as not to require further ALI action.
a. International Credit Transfers: Comments on the Draft Model Law on Interna-
tional Credit Transfers: Report of the Secretary General, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. S/CN.9/
WG.IV/WP.44 (1989) [hereinafter Draft Model Law].
6. The UNCITRAL group took 12 years to draft the Convention on International Bills
of Exchange and International Promissory Notes, which was approved by the United Na-
tions in 1989. United Nations Convention on International Bills of Exchange and
International Promissory Notes, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/RES/43/165 (1989).
7. The first UNCITRAL product was Legal Guide on Electronic Funds Transfers,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SER.B/1 (1987). This evolved into a set of Model Rules on Electronic
Funds Transfers, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/318 (1989). The Model Rules evolved quickly into the
Model Law.
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ultimate adoption by the member states as a treaty, it is the aspi-
ration of UNCITRAL that its product shall ultimately govern
international EFTs.
Ostensibly, the drafters of Article 4A and of the Model Law
were designing a statute to cover the same general form of funds
transfer. In actuality, the drafters used different models to guide
their thinking and the focus of their drafts. Those responsible for
Article 4A perceived a high speed, low cost, high volume funds
transfer system as the basic standard.8 As they thought and wrote,
they had something like the United States Federal Reserve Com-
munications System ("FedWire") and the New York Clearing
House Interbank Payments System ("CHIPS") systems before
them. Those that gathered from around the world to write the
Model Law worked with something less specific in mind. It is not
unfair to suggest that they were unsure of what they were writing
about and that they were preparing a law for all sorts of evolved
and evolving systems that will ultimately take their places as es-
tablished forms of payment. These different conceptions had much
to do with creating the basic problem to which we shall return.
Coverage of the Two Laws
Article 4A already has been adopted by several of the United
States.9 The UNCITRAL Model Law will continue for some time,
possibly months-possibly years-through the drafting process. 1°
We will assume for purposes of this Article that both drafts are
legislative successes and have become law.
How the two drafts will divide EFTs between them still re-
mains to be seen. For present purposes, we will take each version
and further assume that they exist side by side as domestic law.
Where their coverage conflicts, our approach will be that the
8. See U.C.C. § 4A-103 comment 2 (1989) ("Transactions covered by Article 4A typi-
cally involve very large amounts of money ").
9. As of July 1990, U.C.C. Article 4A had been enacted by the following states: Califor-
ma, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Minnesota, New York, Oklahoma,
Virginia, and West Virginia. Telephone interview with Ms. K. Robinson, NCCUSL (Oct. 25,
1990).
10. A tentative schedule has been informally proposed: a clean, final draft by July
1990; United Nations approval at the annual meeting in June 1991. Whether this schedule is
realistic remains to be seen.
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Model Law preempts." Thus, a typical EFT within the United
States will be governed by Article 4A and a transfer defined as
"international" by the UNCITRAL Model Law will be governed
by that law.'2 (Deviations from that pattern will be commented
upon where appropriate). 3
We will take the two versions presently before us to analyze
the differences between them, to try and predict whether their si-
multaneous existence will create problems for the banking system
and-since such problems will be found to exist-how the collision
referred to in the first paragraph of this Article may be avoided.
The Perception of Conflict
One comment can be made up front. The drafters of each of
the two packages have been well aware of their opposite number
and have demonstrated no particular concern for inconsistencies or
conflicts. The reasons for this cavalier attitude are several. Among
them:
1. The domestic draftsmen in the United States saw an imme-
diate need for legislation. Massive sums of money were moving in
the international markets. Because this was a relatively recent de-
velopment, there was no statutory law and very little case law to
resolve controversies that might arise. A few cases, to which we
shall refer, only served to demonstrate to those involved with
funds transfers the risks to which they were subject. The drafts-
11. This is appropriate for two reasons. First, it is likely that if the Model Law is
enacted at all it will be as federal law, either a treaty or a statute. As such, it will preempt
Article 4A which will be state law. Second, since the Model Law is exclusively for interna-
tional transfers and 4A is for all transfers, domestic and international, the Model Law
should be considered a specialized statute which should govern in the area of its coverage.
12. In the absence of the Model Law, Article 4A purports to cover some international
transfers. Its choice of law provisions make the Article apply if a designated bank which is
part of the funds transfer is located in the United States. U.C.C. § 4A-507 (1989). Whether
this choice of law policy will be honored by foreign jurisdictions is a difficult question and
beyond the scope of this Article. See Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co., 1
Lloyd's Rep. 259 (Q.B. 1988); Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust
Co. (No. 2), 1 Lloyd's Rep. 608 (Q.B. 1989) (United States law governing banks cannot es-
tablish bank-depositor relationships in England.).
13. 4A is designed to cover international as well as domestic transfers, so long as the
requisite elements connecting the EFT to 4A are present. Also, the Model Law does not
cover all EFTs with international ingredients, but only those that satisfy the Model Law's
definition of "international." It is not impossible, therefore, to visualize an EFT with inter-
national aspects that will be governed by Article 4A and not the Model Law.
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men of 4A felt that they could not negotiate or collaborate with
UNCITRAL given the extended time that UNCITRAL might take
to complete its drafting process.
2. UNCITRAL, on the other hand, saw the United States as
only one fish in a large international pond. The fact that domestic
United States law adopts one policy is no reason for the rest of the
world to fall into line. (Adoption of a particular policy by the U.S.
might even be a reason for proceeding differently.)
3. The individual representatives sent by the member states to
the Working Group of UNCITRAL responsible for the EFT-Model
Law have generally not been expert in EFTs. It seems, in fact, un-
likely that most of the United Nations states have people who are
sufficiently conversant with this subject to draft legislation. While
those states undoubtedly do have bankers from whose ranks repre-
sentatives can be, and not infrequently have been, chosen, most of
the UNCITRAL representation is made up of diplomats or govern-
ment bureaucrats.14 While bankers have typically advised their
countries' representatives, it is unfortunate that those with direct
responsibility for the UNCITRAL product have not been generally
sensitive to the issues that the legislation before them presents.
4. Something of the same can be said of the 4A draftsmen.
While more technical experts took part in the 4A project than par-
ticipated in UNCITRAL, the representatives of the NCCUSL itself
were neither bankers nor electronics experts and showed little
awareness of potential international conflicts throughout the draft-
ing process.
5. Both drafting groups have expressed confidence that
whatever conflicts develop can be resolved in some manner when
they arise.
The need for law covering EFTs in both the domestic and in-
ternational arenas, together with the essential absence of existing
law anywhere, seemed to some to create an atmosphere that would
be particularly receptive to a single draft that could be applicable
to both forms of EFT Electronic payments obviously could pro-
ceed most effectively in a legal environment free of conflicts and
14. An informal count by the author at the December 1989 UNCITRAL meeting in
Vienna revealed 29 diplomats or government bureaucrats, 19 bankers, 3 lawyers and 3
academics.
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uncertainty This point was made to both drafting groups without
avail.15
Efforts have been made to reconcile the two drafts. The prin-
cipal draftsmen met approximately three times without particular
result. Consultative groups established by the U.S. State Depart-
ment have resolved, with some success, to influence UNCITRAL to
draft something closer to 4A. Indeed, that effort goes on and I
would be presuming too much to predict the final form of UNCI-
TRAL's legislation.
Part II of this Article will deal briefly with the history of the
two statutory products before us. It is intended to show that
greater efforts to correspond those versions might have been, but
were not, made. Part III will treat some conflicts between the ver-
sions. It would unduly try the patience of the reader to identify all
of those inconsistencies; I will address only some of the more fun-
damental differences between the drafts. Part IV will examine one
significant subject dealt with by Article 4A but omitted by the
Model Law Part V contains some speculations about the future.
II. HISTORIES OF THE Two DRAFTS
Article 4A
In 1978, a committee established by the Permanent Editorial
Board ("PEB") for the U.C.C. by the ALI and the NCCUSL to
monitor Articles 3, 4 and 8 of the U.C.C. was charged with drafting
an outline of a New Payments Code ("NPC"), which would estab-
lish a framework of rules for all forms of payment except cash.16
The task was essentially delegated to a bright young Harvard Law
School professor, Professor Hal S. Scott, who exposed a series of
fundamental similarities among a number of the major payment
systems (checks, credit cards, debit cards, and EFTs) and wrote a
code merging them together subject to a single set of rules. The
15. It was presented most plainly to UNCITRAL because 4A had already taken shape
and the benefits of using it as a model seemed self-evident. The argument was essentially
ignored as was a plea to the Uniform Commissioners that they delay passage to take account
of UNCITRAL action.
16. See Memorandum from Hal S. Scott, Reporter to the 3-4-8 Committee and Peter
L. Murray, Assistant Reporter to the 3-4-8 Committee to members of the U.C.C. Permanent
Editorial Board and members of the 3-4-8 Committee (Feb. 24, 1981) (P.E.B. Draft no. I
preceding the New Payments Code).
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NPC will not be explored in any depth,17 other than to say that it
was perceived as revolutionary rather than evolutionary by the
banking community and, indeed, by the consumer groups whose
causes the NPC recognized. The NPC was rejected by general con-
sensus in 1985.
Near the end of the NPC adventure, the banking community
was shaken by the case of Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp.'8 Faced
with the possibility that a bank that had negligently mishandled a
funds transfer might be saddled with the resulting business losses
of the sender (the bank, in fact, was not), the banking community
realized a need for EFT legislation. As a result, the NCCUSL es-
tablished a new committee to write an umbrella EFT Uniform
Law, and work began at a meeting in Arlington, Virginia in Janu-
ary of 1986. The Committee's work was serious and directed,
resulting in a draft accepted by the ALI and the NCCUSL in 1989
which ultimately became Uniform Article 4A to the U.C.C.
The UNCITRAL Model Law
The development of the international effort is somewhat
harder to target. It may have begun in 1972 when UNCITRAL ex-
pressed interest in international electronic funds transfers. 9 It
may also be deemed to have begun in June 1977 with an Interna-
tional Payments Symposium in Washington, D.C.20 Another
potential starting date is October 1982, when the Committee on
the Development of Trade of the U.N. Economic and Social Coun-
cil recognized the need for rules regarding telecommunications and
identified UNCITRAL as the logical central forum for this
project.2"
17. For a study of the New Payments Code in an EFT context, see Scott, Corporate
Wire Transfers and the Uniform New Payments Code, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1164 (1983).
18. 673 F.2d 951 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1017 (1982).
19. Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the
Work of its Fifth Session, U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) para. 136, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/99
(1972).
20. This symposium resulted in a 1978 report. See United States Nat'l Comm'n on
Electronic Fund Transfers, International Payments Symposium (1978) (available at Nat'l
Tech. Info. Serv., U.S. Dep't Com., 5285 Port Royal Rd., Springfield, VA 22161).
21. U.N. GAOR Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law, U.N. Doc. TRADE]WP.4/R.185/Rev.
(1982).
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UNCITRAL established a Study Group on International Pay-
ments22 composed of representatives of banking and trade
institutions and issued a report in 1982.23 This report did not pro-
pose legislation, but rather was a survey of international electronic
funds systems and practices. The report was developed into a Le-
gal Guide on Electronic Funds Transfers, issued in 1987 24
UNCITRAL finally set up a formal Working Group on Interna-
tional Payments which began consideration of a set of rules
governing international electronic funds transfers at a meeting in
Vienna in November 1987 25 The deliberations of that Working
Group, through a series of successive meetings, resulted in the UN-
CITRAL Model Law which we are now considering.
The Two Laws
The object of this brief history is to demonstrate that the
drafting work of UNCITRAL and that of the NCCUSL proceeded
over the same time period. Each was well aware of the work of the
other. Indeed, certain individuals (including the author of this Ar-
ticle) served in both camps. Neither group had to deal with
extensive legislation on the books of the United States or any other
country for which an accommodation had to be made. To some, it
seemed like an ideal time to craft legislation that, in a consistent
manner, would regulate EFTs within the United States through
domestic law and, at the same time, EFTs on the international
scene. This was not to be. (At least, not yet.)
Article 4A took shape before the UNCITRAL draft. By the
time actual drafting began on UNCITRAL, most of the concepts in
4A had crystalized. It is clear from its structure and general ap-
proach that the UNCITRAL draft used 4A as a model. It is equally
clear that the 4A draftsmen were well aware of UNCITRAL efforts
before a final 4A draft was accomplished. Differences between the
two drafts cannot be deemed accidents. Those differences are un-
22. Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 17) paras. 55, 56, U.N. Doe. A/34/17 (1981).
23. U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/221 (1982).
24. UNCITRAL Legal Guide on Electronic Funds Transfers, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/SER.13./i (1987).
25. Rapport Du Grouppe de Travail des Paiements Internationaux Sur Les Travaux
de sa Seizieme Session, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/297 (1987).
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fortunate, could have been avoided and, unless they are somehow
resolved, will probably prove costly.
III. CONFLICTS BETWEEN 4A AND THE MODEL LAW
Assumptins
We will assume for the purposes of this Article a transfer by
Originator ("0") to Beneficiary ("B"), begun by an order by 0 to
the Originator's Bank ("OB") and sent to the Beneficiary's Bank
("BB") through Intermediary Banks X and Y Most of these terms
are used and defined in the two laws.26 We can diagram the trans-
action as follows:
0- OB-X--Y---- BB--.B
In the language of 4A, the overall transfer by which 0 pays B
is called a "funds transfer, 2 7 and each ingredient of the funds
transfer (the order from 0 to OB, the order from OB to X, etc.) is
called a "payment order." The UNCITRAL draft calls the overall
electronic payment by 0 to B a "credit transfer" and also calls
each ingredient a "payment order. '28 For simplicity, we will use
the 4A terminology herein.
26. In Article 4A, "beneficiary" and "beneficiary's bank" are defined in section 4A-103;
and "originator," "originator's bank" and "intermediary bank" are defined in section 4A-
104. See U.C.C. §§ 4A-103(a)(2) & (3) & 4A-104(b), (c) & (d) (1989). In the Model Law,
"originator," "beneficiary" and "intermediary bank" are defined in Article 2. See Draft
Model Law, supra note 5, art. 2.
27. U.C.C. § 4A-104 (1989). Actually the funds transfer may fairly be considered to be
completed upon acceptance by the beneficiary's bank, BB, since that is the time selected by
both 4A and the Model Law for the satisfaction of O's obligations to B. Both laws take the
position that the obligation of the beneficiary's bank to the beneficiary is substituted for the
obligation of the originator to the beneficiary. See U.C.C. § 4A-406 (1989); Draft Model
Law, supra note 5, art. 14 comment 4. This ingredient is recognized by the 4A definition of
funds transfer but not by the definition of credit transfer in the Model Law. See Draft
Model Law, supra note 5, art. 2(a) (defining a credit transfer as a "complete movement of
funds from the originator to the beneficiary").
28. The final step in the funds transfer is the payment from BB to B. This is not, in
the structure of either 4A or the Model Law, a "payment order." See U.C.C. 4A-103(a)(1)
(1989) (defining "payment order"); Draft Model Law, supra note 5, art. 2(a) (defining
"credit transfer").
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Scope of Application of the Codes
The transactions covered by 4A and the UNCITRAL draft
vary considerably Should the codes ultimately coexist, the rela-
tionship between them can be best described as peculiar. We may
consider the division of coverage from several points of view
Type of Transaction
Consistencies do exist between the two drafts. Both are
designed to cover credit, not debit, transfers.29 The typical com-
mercial electronic funds transfer today is of a credit rather than a
debit type,30 and both drafts concentrate upon the commercial, not
the consumer, transaction. To the extent that the workings of the
marketplace can now recommend appropriate legal rules for a com-
mercial funds transfer, those workings are far more evident for
credit than for debit transfers; rules for the operation of debit
transfers, although specifically covered with regard to consumer
transactions in the United States in another context,31 are left for
another day in the Model Law and 4A.
Another area of similarity between the two drafts, consistent
with the limitation of both to credit transfers, is in their exclusion
of checks, the most common form of debit transfer. Article 4A ex-
cludes checks and check-like instruments. s2 Checks are already
29. A credit transfer is considered to be an order by the originator/sender to its own
bank to transfer funds to a third party. A debit transfer is an order by the intended recipi-
ent that funds be transferred to its bank by a third party's bank. While both credit and
debit transfers embody both credits and debits to accounts, the foregoing definitions have
generally been accepted by the international banking community and need not be ques-
tioned, here or elsewhere. Today, credit transfers are by far the dominant form of
commercial funds transfer. Debit transfers, while still secondary to credit transfers, are
more prevalent in consumer transactions where regular payments may be made through an
automatic clearing house system to pay premiums to an insurance carrier or landlord or
other regular creditor. Article 4A limits itself to credit and excludes debit transfers through
the definition of "payment order," particularly section 4A-103(a)(1)(ii). See U.C.C. § 4A-
103(a)(1)(ii) (1989). See also id. § 4A-104 comment 4. The UNCITRAL draft defines its core
transaction in Article 1 as a "credit transfer" and defines that term in Article 2(a). See
Draft Model Law, supra note 5, arts. 1 & 2(a).
30. Compare U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/221 paras. 11 & 17 (1982) (for the Draft Model Law)
with U.C.C. § 4A-104 comment 4 (1989) (for Article 4A).
31. Note that the definition of an electronic fund transfer in the Electronic Fund
Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1693r (1988), covers both debits and credits to accounts.
32. U.C.C. § 4A-103(a)(1)(iii) (1989). Its intended effect is stated in U.C.C. § 4A-104
comment 5 (1989).
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covered by statutory law in the United States.33 Given that exclu-
sion, 4A does not, however, define with any degree of precision the
form of funds transfer that it is designed to cover. 4 Possibly, in
view of the current rate of technological development, this cannot
be defined. Under 4A, the transfer may be slow or it may be fast. 5
It may be accomplished electronically, by wire, by mail or even
orally 36 Article 4A covers all techniques of funds transfer other
than cash and other than payment through traditional paper docu-
ments (including, of course, a check) that might be deemed an
"item" under Article 4 of the U.C.C.17 As we have observed, how-
ever, high speed, low cost electronic transfers were actually central
to the thinking of the 4A drafters.3
33. See U.C.C. arts. 3 & 4 (1989) (governing domestic transactions). The 1934 Geneva
Convention Providing a Uniform Law for Cheques, see supra note 2, governs European
checks for the contracting states. A Report of the UNCITRAL Working Group on EFTs
notes that "few countries had statutory rules governing paper-based credit transfers." Re-
port of the Working Group on Int'l Payments on the Work of its Eighteenth Session, U.N.
GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/318 (1989). UNCITRAL began consideration of a Convention on
International Cheques, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/212 (1981), but the project was
dropped in 1984 in favor of the Convention on International Bills of Exchange and Interna-
tional Promissory Notes. Report of UNCITRAL, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/39/17 (1984).
The latter Convention was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly at its annual meeting in
1988.
34. This is consistent with the essentially vague coverage of Article 4 of the U.C.C.,
which is by its own terms applicable to an "item." This is defined as "an instrument or a
promise or order to pay money handled by a bank for collection or payment." U.C.C. § 4-
104(a)(9) (1990). Cases have dealt with the question of whether an EFT can be deemed an
item and generally concluded that it is not. See Delbrueck & Co. v. Manufacturers Hanover
Trust Co., 609 F.2d 1045 (2d Cir. 1979).
35. U.C.C. art. 4A prefatory note (1989) (commenting that "in some cases the payment
order is transmitted by a slow means").
36. A payment order may be "transmitted orally, electronically, or in writing." U.C.C.
§ 4A-103(a)(1) (1989).
37. In the sense that U.C.C. section 4A-103(a)(1) includes a written order as a pay-
ment order and that revised section 4-104(a)(9) (1990) defines an item subject to Article 4 as
"an instrument or a promise or order to pay money," Articles 4 and 4A will come close to
overlapping. Compare U.C.C. § 4A-103(a)(1) (1989) with U.C.C. § 4-104(a)(9) (1990). The
courts may be called upon to crystalize the activities covered by each. To some degree the
courts have already been doing this and excluding electronic payment systems from Article
4. See Delbrueck & Co. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 609 F.2d 1045 (2d Cir. 1979).
Article 4A does require that, to qualify, the payment be made through the banking system.
See the definition in U.C.C. § 4A-103(1) (1989) and zd. § 4A-104 comment 2. Revised Article
4 does, however, make it clear that "[tihe term [item under Article 4] does not include a
payment order governed by Article 4A." U.C.C. § 4-104(a)(9) (1990).
38. See supra text accompanying note 8.
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The UNCITRAL draft approaches the coverage issue differ-
ently but, subject to the reduced focus of its drafters on the high
speed, low cost EFTs, seems to arrive at about the same result.
Through its definition of "payment order," the traditional check is
excluded from its coverage. 9 By a recent elimination of the word
"electronic" from its title,4 ° it was established that the draft was to
cover paper, wire and other devices as well as purely electronic
transmissions.
Conflicts of Laws
Articles 3 and 4 of the U C.C. (and the Negotiable Instruments
Law, Article 3's source), give very little instruction as to when a
transaction within the definitional coverage of the Articles is, in
fact, subject to its rules." Standard principles of conflicts of laws
therefore determine the rules for most cases. This in turn depends
to large measure upon the forum state and its views upon conflicts
issues. Existing law, as made applicable to Articles 3 and 4 of the
U.C.C., yields almost any result that may be desired; the cases give
maximum discretion to the courts and minimum guidance to the
parties.42
39. Draft Model Law, supra note 5, art. 2(a)-(b)(i). Through its definition of a credit
transfer in Article 2(a) and its requirement that the original payment order be given by the
originator to its bank, checks are excluded since a check is given by the beneficiary (payee)
or other holder to the payor bank. This point is made explicitly in comment 5 to U.C.C.
section 4A-104, see supra note 32, but may fairly be implied in the Model Law. Checks are
not generally covered by statutory law outside the United States. The UNCITRAL Working
Group Report of Jan. 27, 1989, para. 16, notes that "few countries had statutory rules gov-
erning paper-based credit transfers." See Report of the Working Group on Int'l Payments
on the Work of Its Eighteenth Session, supra note 33, at para. 16.
40. See supra note 33.
41. Revised U.C.C. section 4-102 provides guidance for establishing the law for a
bank's liability, but Article 4 does not go beyond this. See U.C.C. § 4-102 (1990).
42. The cases, applicable almost entirely to negotiable instruments before the U.C.C.
(with the advent of the U.C.C., essentially uniform in all states with respect to Articles 3
and 4, the stream of conflicts cases virtually dried up), which became the law of all 50 states
for commercial paper, reveal the following guiding principles for the choice of applicable
law:
(1) The law where the instrument was written, National Bank of Am. v. Calhoun, 253 F
Supp. 346 (D. Kan. 1966);
(2) the law where the instrument was delivered. Browns Valley State Bank v. Porter,
232 F 434 (8th Cir. 1916);
(3) the law of the place where the party whose obligation is at issue signed the instru-
ment, Guernsey v. Imperial Bank of Can., 188 F 300 (8th Cir. 1911);
734
Strange Bedfellows
Both Article 4A and the Model Law fill this vacuum by sup-
plying more extensive conflicts rules as to their applications.
Unfortunately, the rules are not consistent. To begin with 4A, I
will illustrate its application by a few examples from its choice of
law provisions:
a. The issue of when the originator of a funds transfer makes
payment to the beneficiary is governed by the law of the juris-
diction in which the beneficiary's bank is located.
b. The parties may vary their legal relationships by selecting
the law of a particular jurisdiction, whether or not that juris-
diction has any relationship to the underlying transaction.
c. The rules of a funds transfer system may select the law of a
particular jurisdiction and bind a bank (among others)
outside that system so long as the bank had notice that (i) the
system might be used and (ii) of the system's choice of law.43
The preceding examples were chosen not as a cross-section of the
4A conflicts rules, but were selected because they illustrate some
inconsistencies with the conflicts rules of the Model Law. Taking
them in order, the situations are handled as follows under the
Model Law:
a. The relationship of originator and beneficiary is controlled
by the law of the jurisdiction where the obligation is to be
discharged.
b. The law selected must be of a state of the sender, the re-
ceiver or the country whose currency is used.c. There is no
reference in the Model Law to funds transfer system rules.44
In the event that both 4A and the Model Law are adopted,
these inconsistencies, among the others ahead, will cause obvious
(4) the law of the place of payment, Guernsey v. Imperial Bank of Can., 188 F 300 (8th
Cir. 1911);
(5) the law intended by the parties to the instrument, Ryder Truck Lines v. Goren
Equip. Co., 576 F Supp. 1348 (N.D. Ga. 1983);
(6) the law of the place with the most significant relationship to or the most important
contacts with the instrument, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 188 (1969);
(7) for issues relating to remedies or procedure, the law of the forum, Wingold v.
Horowitz, 292 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 1974); and
(8) where foreign law is not proved, the law of the forum, Pioneer Credit Corp. v.
Carden, 127 Vt. 229, 245 A.2d 891 (1968).
43. See U.C.C. § 4A-507 (1989).
44. See Model Law art. 15.
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problems for sending and receiving banks, for originators and for
beneficiaries. The particular law that governs the transaction will
include the rules for its own application. Transactions identical in
quality will, depending upon whether they are domestic or interna-
tional-that is, governed by 4A or the Model Law-fall within or
without those laws based upon their inharmonious conflicts of laws
principles.
Consumer Transactions
If we regard the overall coverage of the two drafts, we discern
a strange status for consumer-related transfers. We begin with the
assumption common to both drafts that consumer transactions are
not central to their approaches. Assume, however, that Mary in
New York orders her bank to take $100 from her personal account
and wire it to John in San Francisco for John's birthday Subject
to the exception soon to be noted, that transfer will probably not
be covered by either law It is in the first instance not covered by
4A because section 4A-108 provides that "[tihis Article does not
apply to a funds transfer any part of which is governed by the
Electronic Fund Transfer Act of 1978 (Title XX, Public Law 95-
630, 92 Stat. 3728, 15 U.S.C. § 1693 et seq.) as amended from time
to time. '45 Mary's transfer, a garden variety consumer transfer,
would typically be covered by the Electronic Fund Transfer Act
("EFTA")4" and would therefore be excluded from 4A. The under-
lying reason for this exclusion is that consumer transfers raise
many issues in the perception of the legal marketplace that do not
affect the typical business transaction. Article 4A was drafted with
the Evra problem in mind 41 and its draftsmen decided, quite prop-
erly, to avoid consumer-related issues.48
The EFTA excludes from its coverage, however, transfers ef-
fected through the FedWire and other similar networks, which
45. U.C.C. § 4A-108 (1989).
46. 15 U.S.C. § 1693(b) (1988). This opening section of EFTA reads: "The primary
objective of this subchapter, however, is the provision of individual consumer rights." 15
U.S.C. § 1693(b) (1988).
47. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
48. The New Payments Code, see supra note 16 and accompanying text, attempted to
cover consumer as well as commercial funds transfers. This element was not insignificant in
its downfall.
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undoubtedly would include CHIPS.4e Thus, if Mary's transfer were
effected through such a system, it would be excluded from EFTA
and thereby made subject to 4A. For the typical case, however,
Mary's transfer would not be covered by 4A. It would also not be
covered by the UNCITRAL draft, because its international prereq-
uisites are not met.50
Several issues are raised by this division. First, if instead of
the hypothetical $100 birthday present we assume that Mary wired
John $1 million to buy John's business and that the $1 million
came from Mary's personal account, it would still not (subject to
the FedWire, CHIPS, etc., exceptions) be covered by 4A, even
though the transfer is commercial, not consumer, in nature. The
EFTA covers transfers, regardless of the amount or purpose, made
from an account "established primarily for personal, family, or
household purposes."5' Mary's transfer is covered by EFTA, how-
ever, it is excluded from 4A and it is also, through lack of an
international quality, excluded by the UNCITRAL draft. One
would expect that this type of large, personal transfer does not oc-
cur very often.
In addition, assuming coverage under the EFTA (and exclu-
sion from 4A and the UNCITRAL draft), this does not mean that
the legal problems that may arise in connection with a funds trans-
fer from Mary to John are necessarily covered. The EFTA is a
statute driven by consumer concerns and its major coverages relate
to such issues as disclosure and consumer protection. Issues cov-
ered by 4A and the Model Law, such as when a transfer is
completed, when the transferor's obligation to the transferee is
paid, and the liability of a negligent bank are not part- of EFTA.
Thus, given the present approach of the drafts, many aspects of a
funds transfer, "any part of which" 52 is covered by EFTA, will not
be covered at all. 3
49. 15 U.S.C. § 1693a(6)(B) (1988); 12 C.F.R. § 205.3(b) (1990).
50. See infra note 204. The Model Law contains as an optional provision a statement
that it "is subject to any national legislation dealing with the rights and obligations of con-
sumers." Draft Model Law, supra note 5, art. 1.
51. 15 U.S.C. § 1693a(2) (1988) (emphasis added).
52. U.C.C. § 4A-108 (1989).
53. If Mary's transfer to John were international in nature, as defined by the UNCI-
TRAL Model Law, I can see no reason why it would not be covered by the Model Law,
although not covered by 4A.
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Considerations such as these appear to be an inherent result of
the decision of the NCCUSL to separate consumer transactions
from the major, commercial scope of 4A. Both laws are consistent
in their recognition of consumer issues" as a special problem. This
approach is undoubtedly correct; consumer issues and consumer
protections are different from the basic commercial concerns of the
two laws. The laws differ, however, in the way they recognize these
issues.
Allocation of Responsibilities
A fundamental illustration of the differences in concept be-
tween Article 4A and the Model Law is provided by the approach
each takes to errant payment orders received by a bank. An order
received by a bank might be unauthorized by the originator or by
any sender in the chain prior to that bank. It might contain infor-
mation indicating that it has been misdirected, or it might contain
inconsistencies between information given in words (either the
name of a beneficiary or an amount of money) and that informa-
tion expressed in numbers. To the extent that an error can be
gleaned from the terms of the payment order itself, the Model Law
requires that a receiving bank give its sender notice thereof.5 5 In
the absence of actual knowledge to the contrary, Article 4A con-
tains no such requirement. 56 Indeed, 4A burdens the sender with a
kind of obligation to discover the error itself.
54. If the Model Law's optional provision stating that it "is subject to any national
legislation dealing with the rights and obligations of consumers," Draft Model Law, supra
note 5, art. 1, is adopted, one cannot be entirely sure whether Mary's funds transfer would
or would not be included in the coverage of the law. Would only the aspects of the transfer
that are covered by EFTA (or any applicable consumer law) be excluded from the Model
Law9 Or would the 4A approach be found more attractive, in which event the entire trans-
action would not be covered? The former would seem to be better law. The latter is more
consistent with the 4A pattern.
55. Draft Model Law, supra note 5, arts. 6(3) & (5) and 8(2) & (3). Comment 3 to
Model Law Article 8 notes the "substantial difficulties" involved in any solution to this
problem. Strangely, the comments to Article 6, which deals with a comparable problem, do
not note any particular difficulty. See id. arts. 8 comment 3 & 6 comment.
56. U.C.C. section 4A-205 does deal with inconsistencies between the name and num-
ber of a beneficiary, but does not contain a provision dealing with inconsistencies between
numbers and words in describing an amount of money. See U.C.C. § 4A-205 (1989). Presum-
ably, this is because no modern high speed system uses words at all. See also U.C.C. § 4A-
208 (1989).
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The Model Law imposes a burden upon both intermediary
banks in the funds transfer and the beneficiary's bank to under-
take a continuing examination of the payment orders they receive
to establish that they do not contain errors.57 For example, it re-
quires each intermediary bank to establish that no payment order
received "contains information which indicates that it has been
misdirected. '5 Article 4A, on the other hand, permits the receiving
bank to accept and retransmit the order on the basis of the infor-
mation it contains and without the necessity of this kind of
detective work.
Even if the payment order was not authorized by a sending
customer, 4A imposes a burden of care upon it. If a receiving bank
accepts an unauthorized order, any payment it receives from the
purported sender must be returned. It must also pay interest to
the sender.6 0 However, if the sender does not exercise due 'care in
discovering the error, it loses its right to interest.6 1 Similarly, an-
other section in 4A allocates where the burden will fall between
sender and receiver for certain designated types of error.6 2 The sec-
tion goes on to provide, however, that if the sender does not
exercise "ordinary care, on the basis of information available to the
sender," the sending bank is liable to the receiving bank for any
loss, up to the amount of the order, suffered by the latter.6 3
Obviously, we are looking at different concepts of what an
EFT should be. Article 4A views it as a highly mechanized, high
speed process that does not permit careful, individual, personal
scrutiny by banks performing mechanistic functions. In terms of
expense, 4A clearly sees low cost as a greater goal than perfection.
That is, if humans had to review each transfer, the cost structure
that has become an accepted part of high speed EFTs would sim-
ply be impossible. The Model Law tends to analogize the EFT
57. See Draft Model Law, supra note 5, arts. 6 & 8.
58. Draft Model Law, supra note 5, art. 6(2).
59. U.C.C. § 4A-204 (1989). On its face, this may seem to put the type of burden upon
the receiving bank that is more typical of the Model Law approach. Due to the intricacies of
the security system concept, however, the real burden upon a receiving bank is to comply
with the technical niceties of the system. As we shall see, infra text at note 140, if the
security procedures are followed, orders not actually sent by a purported sender may be"authorized" under both the Model Law and 4A.
60. U.C.C. § 4A-204 (1989).
61. Id.
62. U.C.C. § 4A-205 (1989).
63. U.C.C. § 4A-205(b)(ii) (1989).
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system to something more archaic; examinations that slow down
and increase the cost of funds transfers are not inconsistent with
the overall Model Law approach.64
Measure of Damages
As was demonstrated by the Evra case,65 the correct measure
of damages can be the most important part of an EFT controversy
Distinctions between 4A and the Model Law may create problems
here.
If we return to our underlying assumptions,66 it is obvious that
many slips may occur between O's cup and B's lip. For example, X
may negligently (as occurred in Evra) forget to put paper in its
receiving equipment.67 BB may pay W rather than B. What should
the measure of damages for their improper behavior be? Most im-
portant, if 0 has lost the benefit of a bargain because of X's or
BB's error, should X or BB recompense 0 for its lost profits? Such
damages are generally called "consequential damages" and were at
the root of the Evra controversy
Liability of a Receiving Bank68
Article 4A and the Model Law take somewhat different ap-
proaches to consequential damages (although in essence they both
affirm that wing of the Evra case holding that a bank is not liable
64. At its December 1989 meeting, UNCITRAL added another burden upon the first
receiving bank, the bank receiving a payment order from the originator. The Model Law will
provide that the definition of "payment order" in Article 2 will permit such an order to
contain conditions imposed by the originator. This will, of course, require that first receiving
bank to establish that the conditions are satisfied before it accepts the order. Article 4A
requires that a payment order be unconditional. U.C.C. § 4A-103(a)(1)(i) (1989). Article 4A
does permit its requirements to be varied by agreement. U.C.C. § 4A-501(a) (1989). Condi-
tions can, through separate agreement, be imposed by any sender to any receiver, however,
this would be the result of separate negotiations and not an integral part of any payment
order.
65. 673 F.2d 951 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1017 (1982).
66. See supra Part III section A.
67. Evra, 673 F.2d at 953.
68. This includes the originator's bank and an intermediary bank-OB, X and Y in
the foregoing assumptions-but excludes the beneficiary's bank-BB in the assumptions.
We will leave out of this discussion the responsibility of a bank which has not executed a
funds transfer to return the principal amount of the funds it has received to the proper
party. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 4A-303(e) (1989).
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for consequential damages when it is merely negligent"9 ). Article
4A imposes upon a receiving bank a liability to pay interest costs
when it has improperly delayed completion of a funds transfer.70 If
the error is more serious, for example when the transfer is not
completed at all, interest costs are added to the expenses of the
transfer and incidental expenses.7 1 Consequential damages are not
included .in any event (unless provided for by express written
contract) .72
The Model Law's coverage is different. It does not make the
distinction noted above between a mere delay and a complete fail-
ure to execute, but imposes the same liability in both situations. In
the event of a receiving bank's failure to execute properly, the
Model Law holds the bank liable for the following-with conse-
quential damages included under certain circumstances:
(1) loss of interest,
(2) losses caused by a change in exchange rates,
(3) expenses of a new order and attorney fees,
(4) consequential damages if the bank's failure was accom-
plished intentionally or recklessly7'
It was the intent of the drafters of the Model Law, when con-
ceiving of circumstance (4), above, to make consequential damages
available in only the most limited circumstances. It was the
thought of some that, for all practical purposes, they would never
be available. 74 This may be the case in some countries, but the con-
dition of United States tort law, particularly with regard to the
69. Eura, 673 F.2d at 958-59.
70. U.C.C. § 4A-305(a) (1989).
71. U.C.C. § 4A-305(b) (1989). Article 4A does not explain what it means by "inciden-
tal" expenses, but we may assume that they represent costs closely related to the transfer
(telephone expenses, for example) and certainly not the loss of a business bargain. Whether
they cover attorney fees we leave for another day. One may note, however, that since in
section 4A-305, incidental expenses are mentioned in subsection (b) and attorney fees are
separately mentioned in subsection (e), one can reasonably argue that such fees are not
included within the concept of incidental expenses. See id. § 4A-305(b) & (e).
72. U.C.C. § 4A-305(c) & (d) (1989).
73. See Draft Model Law, supra note 5, art. 12.
74. Draft Model Law, supra note 5, art. 12(5). The Model Law is written so as to limit
the possibility of consequential damages as much as seemed reasonable to the drafters.
Thus, such damages may be imposed if the improper (or late) act or omission was done
"with the intent to cause such improper [or late] execution or failure to execute, or reck-
lessly and with knowledge that such improper execution or failure to execute would
probably result." Id.
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subject of intentional torts, makes domestic bankers uneasy as to
what might constitute an intentional act. Given the magnitude of
the risk involved, those bankers are convinced that they cannot af-
ford to hope for favorable judicial rulings on this one.75
Liability of the Beneficiary's Bank
We shall divide our review between obligations to the sender
and obligations to the beneficiary In both areas, consequential
damages play a large part. There are, however, differences between
the two drafts.
1 Obligation of the beneficiary's bank to the
sender -Under 4A, the liability of the beneficiary's bank to its
sender for its error is the same as the liability of any receiving
bank. Neither the definition section nor the substantive law provi-
sions make any distinction among receiving banks for this
purpose.7" As previously noted, consequential damages are not re-
coverable.7 Under the Model Law, the beneficiary's bank's liability
to its sender (and also to the originator) is subject to a different
test from its liability to the beneficiary7 and may-since the
bank's liability for certain types of wrongdoings includes "any
losses" incurred by the sender or originator-include consequential
damages.
2. Obligation to the beneficiary -Under Article 4A, the lia-
bility of a beneficiary's bank to the beneficiary for a failure to pay
over funds due will include the beneficiary's consequential dam-
ages "[i]f the bank refuses to pay after demand by the beneficiary
and receipt of notice of particular circumstances that will give rise
to consequential damages as a result of nonpayment." 9 This is the
75. The problem United States observers have with these limitations is the state of
United States tort law, where, for example, there is no clear concept of intent. It has been
observed on the distinction between intentional and unintentional invasions that: "'Intent'
is also one of the most often misunderstood legal concepts. The distinction between inten-
tional and unintentional invasions draws a bright line of separation among shadings of
almost infinitely varied human experiences." W PROSSER & W KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 8 (5th ed. 1984); see Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Emener, 16 F Supp. 816 (E.D. Mich.
1936); Radio Officers' Union, A.F.L. v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954) (holding that a person
generally intends the consequences of his own acts).
76. See U.C.C. §§ 4A-103 & 4A-305 (1989).
77. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
78. Draft Model Law, supra note 5 art. 12(4)(b).
79. U.C.C. § 4A-404(a) (1989).
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sole place where 4A allows consequential damages as part of an
injured party's remedy
It appears, however, that a beneficiary bank's liability to its
beneficiary will not be governed in the United States by Article 4A,
but rather by Regulation CC of the Federal Reserve System. 0
Congress enacted the Expedited Funds Availability Act 8' in 1987
to protect depositors against undue delays between the time
money is deposited and the time it becomes available for the de-
positors' use. Pursuant to its regulatory authority under the Act, 2
the Federal Reserve promulgated Regulation CC. This, in part,
prescribes the time that electronic funds to the credit of a party in
its bank must be made available to that party 83 The Regulation
also defines the civil penalty for violation of this duty as not to
exceed $1,000 in an individual action or the lesser of $500,000 or
one percent of the bank's net worth in a class action. 4
Regulation CC ("CC") is the law today Although 4A is en-
acted as state law, it will be preempted by CC as a federal
regulation.85 Should the Model Law be enacted by the United
States as federal law, we can only guess as to its relationship to
Regulation CC. For convenience, however, we will assume (as we
have essentially assumed as to the relationship of the Model Law
with 4A)"8 that the Model Law will govern EFTs that it defines as
"international," and that Regulation CC will govern, for subjects
within its scope, the remaining EFTs. These will probably be prin-
cipally domestic transfers. The point to note here is that, although
4A allows consequential damages, 7 Regulation CC does not.
Under the Model Law, one must resort to local law for the
measure of damages.88 Assuming that both the Model Law and
Regulation CC exist as law in the United States, a rational position
is that the CC test is what is intended as the local law prescribed-
by the Model Law, and that the two laws have, through this adop-
tion by reference, achieved harmony A counter argument might be
80. 12 CF.R. § 229.10-.21 (1990).
81. 12 U.S.C §§ 4001-4010 (1988).
82. Id. § 4008.
83. 12 C.F.R. § 229.10(b) (1990).
84. 12 C.F.R. § 229.21 (1990).
85. See infra text accompanying note 219.
86. See supra Part I.
87. See U.C.C. § 4A-404(a) (1989); supra text accompanying note 79.
88. Draft Model Law, supra note 5 art. 12(4)(a).
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made that CC cannot be "local law" for this transaction since,
under our assumptions, it covers a different set of transactions
from those governed by the Model Law One might have resort to
the common law courts for a decision in the manner of Evra89 cre-
ating legal principles for the situation. We need not resolve this
issue here.
Neither law adopts Judge Posner's concept in Evra, derived by
him in turn from the leading English contracts case of Hadley v.
Baxendale,90 that had the defendant bank been aware of the con-
sequences of its negligence, it would have been found responsible
for consequential damages. Under the two laws, a bank's knowl-
edge of potential damage will not determine whether consequential
damages may be imposed. The 4A draftsmen justify this decision
on several grounds." How can one know what information to give
to a bank so that it understands the risk, or the individual at the
bank to whom the information must be given9 Even after the bank
has received the information properly, how will it protect itself in
terms of an appropriate charge structure9 The comments to the
Model Law do not refer to these problems.
Both 4A and the Model Law limit the ability to obtain conse-
quential damages from a negligent bank to a considerably lesser
extent than provided today by the U.C.C. Section 4-402, for exam-
ple, plainly affords a drawer of a check that is wrongly dishonored
the right to obtain consequential damages from his drawee bank.
Section 1-103 provides for tort actions entirely outside the U.C.C.
to the extent not displaced by the U.C.C. Section 4-103(5) on its
face limits negligent banks to the amount of the item as a measure
of damages in mishandling an item.92 It provides, however, for con-
sequential damages where there is bad faith. The reach of 4-103(5)
and its relationship to 1-103, 3-409 and 4-402 is, however, less than
clear.93
89. 673 F.2d 951 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1017 (1982).
90. 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
91. U.C.C. § 4A-305 comment 2 (1989).
92. U.C.C. § 4-103(e) (1990) (the limitation applies to ordinary negligence; the pres-
ence of bad faith raises a different issue).
93. U.C.C. section 1-103 provides for tort actions outside the U.C.C. See U.C.C. § 1-
103 (1989). Presumably consequential damages may be recoverable in such actions. See
Owens v. Andrews Bank & Trust Co., 265 S.C. 490, 220 S.E.2d (1975); Orrico v. Beverly
Bank, 109 Ill. App. 3d 102, 440 N.E.2d 253 (1982); and AmSouth Bank, N.A. v. Spigener,
505 So. 2d 1030 (Ala. 1986) (holding against bank using non-U.C.C. law under the authority
744 [Vol. 42:2:723
Strange Bedfellows
The overall policy of both 4A and the Model Law is clearly to
place severe limits on consequential damages, although they ac-
complish this result differently The banks have sustained their
case on this issue in connection with the drafting of both laws in
that EFTs are typically very large, the remuneration to the banks
for effecting the transfers is very small, and the need for speed and
convenience is very great. As was said in Gatoil (U.S.A.), Inc. v
Forest Hill State Bank, holding a bank liable for consequential
damages "could cripple the banking system by exposing banks to
huge claims for consequential damages where the bank is not privy
to the business dealings of its clients and has no way of foreseeing
or guarding against such exposure for mere lapses in ordinary
care." '94 The possibility that an intermediary bank might-under
some circumstances and albeit of their limited scope-be held lia-
ble for consequential damages under the Model Law may be
considered the most vehement single objection of the United
States banks to its adoption. However narrowly that risk is circum-
scribed, there are enough cases in the expansive United States law
of torts to give this risk a frightening element of reality
Consequential Damages by Contract
Some subtle inconsistencies arise between 4A and the Model
Law when we look more closely at the ability of a bank to assume a
liability for consequential damages by agreement with its cus-
tomer.95 Since the Evra case cast such a long shadow on the
NCCUSL deliberations, this was a question which had to be re-
solved clearly in the draft.
Having resolved that, contrary to the Hadley v. Baxendale96
idea, mere knowledge by a bank would not subject it to conse-
quential damages, the draftsmen felt that a way had to be found to
of U.C.C. § 1-103). See New Ulm State Bank v. Brown, 558 S.W.2d 20 (Tex. Ct. App. 1977)
(section 4-103 applicable to collecting banks but not payor banks). See also U.C.C. § 4-
402(b) (1990) ("Whether any consequential damages are proximately caused by the wrong-
ful dishonor [of an item] is a question of fact to be determined in each case.").
94. 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 171, 183 (D. Md. 1986).
95. There are, of course, various reasons that a bank would be willing to assume this
greater responsibility: it might be well paid for it; it might have special relationships with its
customer; it might do it as a competitive edge; it might be bullied into it by a powerful
customer; exchange rules might provide for the higher level.
96. 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
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enable a bank to assume the greater liability, should it consciously
make that decision. Thus, section 4A-306(c) provides that "dam-
ages, including consequential damages, are recoverable to the
extent provided in an express written contract of the receiving
bank."9 By use of the words "express written contract," it was as-
sumed that the act of the bank would be deliberate, accomplished
with an understanding of the consequences and by an officer with
authority sufficient to bind the bank. s
The Model Law allows consequential damages to be added to
the extent that they are not provided for "by agreement."99
This kind of difference, perhaps inconsequential, perhaps not,
makes the absence of cooperation between the NCCUSL and UN-
CITRAL as regrettable as the differences in underlying substance.
Will a different, lesser agreement satisfy UNCITRAL than that re-
quired to satisfy 4A 9 "An express written contract" does seem to
mean something more than an "agreement." Will the sender's chat
with a bank officer with questionable authority to bind the bank to
massive expenses rise to a higher order under the Model Law than
under 4A? One hopes that the resolutions will be the same so that
a bank will be subject to the same set of standards whether it is
sending to San Francisco or to Zurich. The language is, however,
different and that can be used to justify different results.100
Responsibility of Originator's and Intermediary Banks for the
Completion of Funds Transfers
Both versions place a responsibility upon the originator's bank
and upon subsequent intermediary banks to ensure that the funds
97. U.C.C. § 4A-306(c) (1989).
98. Hypotheticals were put to the draftsmen: suppose the message sender asked the
clerk receiving the message whether the bank would stand behind the send and the clerk
responded in the affirmative. This might be less than express; it certainly is not written.
Before the express, written document passed, one would think that it would find its way to
one in authority. There is no requirement, however, that the document be signed. A weary
group of draftsmen had had enough.
99. Draft Model Law, supra note 5, art. 12(7).
100. "Where the legislature uses different language in the same connection, in differ-
ent parts of the statute, it is presumed that a different meaning and effect was intended."
F.J. McCAFFREY, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 13, at 40 (1953) (citing Catalanello v. Cudahy
Packing Co., 27 N.Y.S.2d 637 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1941), aff'd, 264 A.D. 723, 34 N.Y.S.2d 37,
appeal denied, 264 A.D. 779, 35 N.Y.S.2d 726 (1942)).
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transfer arrives at the beneficiary's bank. In some consequential
details, however, they proceed under different rules.
The nature of the funds transfer that we have established as
our basic assumption 0 1 follows closely the intended path of the
funds transfer in the Evra case.10 2 In Evra, the intermediary bank
(Bank Y in our basic assumption) lost the order through its negli-
gence and the Seventh Circuit held that it was not liable for the
consequential damages that resulted. 0 3 The Evra plaintiff had also
sued its own bank (OB in the above schematic) for breach of con-
tract and in negligence; it was found not liable on either count. 04
We will now examine the status such a bank would hold under
the Model Law or 4A. Swiss Bank, an intermediary bank-Bank Y
in the model-was found guilty of negligence. We shall also ex-
amine its status under the two new draft laws if it had not been
found negligent, and the transfer still did not reach the benefi-
ciary's bank. The two draft laws handle these problems similarly
but not identically
Article 4A places what it calls a "money-back guarantee" re-
sponsibility upon all receiving banks except the beneficiary's
bank.105 Each receiving bank first has a duty to comply with the
terms of the order that it accepts. 06 Under the statute, however,
that only causes the funds to be moved to the next bank in line. 10 7
The draft goes on to provide that "if the funds transfer is not com-
pleted by acceptance by the beneficiary's bank," no sender,
including the originator (0 in the basic assumption) has to pay the
amount of the transfer and, if it does pay, it is entitled to a refund
with interest from the bank receiving payment. 0 s As previously
101. See supra Part III section A.
102. 673 F.2d 951 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1017 (1982).
103. Evra, 673 F.2d at 959.
104. Id. The plaintiff Hyman-Michaels sued the Swiss Bank; that bank impleaded Hy-
man-Michaels' bank, the Continental Bank; Continental cross-claimed against Hyman-
Michaels' who counterclaimed against Continental. Hyman-Michaels's claims against the
Continental Bank were for breach of contract and negligence. Continental was found not
guilty of either. Id. at 960.
105. See U.C.C. § 4A-402 comment 2 (1989) (explaining the idea of the money-back
guarantee).
106. U.C.C. § 4A-302(a)(1) (1989).
107. Id.
108. U.C.C. § 4A-402(d) (1989). Cf. id. § 4A-402(e) (if the bank whose act caused the
failure is unable to repay, the loss is borne by the first bank in the funds transfer that
ordered the use of that bank).
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noted,0 1 it is receipt by the beneficiary's bank that discharges the
obligation as to which the funds transfer is made. Through the
money-back guarantee, the banking system gives the originator its
assurance that, once the transfer has been properly begun, the
originator's expectation of ultimate payment will be honored.
The UNCITRAL Model Law has a similar rule. It provides:
The originator's bank and each intermediary bank that accepts a
payment order is liable to its sender and to the originator for the
losses as set out in paragraph (5)[110] of this article- caused by the
non-execution or the improper execution of the credit transfer as
instructed in the originator's payment order. The credit transfer is
properly executed if a payment order consistent with the payment
order issued by the originator is accepted by the beneficiary's bank
within the time required by article 9."'
The "money-back guarantee" responsibility of a bank under
4A is consonant with the general idea of a guaranty; if the transfer
is not completed, any funds received must be returned with inter-
est. If payment has not been made, there is no duty upon the
sender to pay The concept is different under the Model Law The
receiving bank is subject to something deemed a "liability""' 2 and
the "paragraph (5)" referred to in the above quotation from the
Model Law subjects banks to the same potential for consequential
damages as was described, above, in section C."3 It was the sense
of the Working Group of UNCITRAL that the banks were gener-
ally in a better situation than the originator to discover what went
wrong; this loss burden should, therefore, be put upon them.114
The decision inherent in both draft laws to put this responsi-
bility upon the intermediary banks reminds one of the historic
New York Rule/Massachusetts Rule controversy which concerned
109. See supra note 27.
110. Model Law Article 12(5) specifies the measure of damages and will be dealt with
later in this discussion. See Draft Model Law, supra note 5, art. 12(5).
111. Id. art. 12(2).
112. The entire concept of Model Law Article 12, within which the quoted paragraph
resides, is one of liability. See id. art. 12.
113. Once the responsibility is termed a liability, it has been pointed out in UNCI-
TRAL sessions that the possibility exists for other, separate damages under the local legal
systems of various countries. That avenue will not be explored in this Article.
114. Report of the Working Group on International Payments on the Work of Its
Nineteenth Session, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/328 (1989) (views as to the responsibil-
ity of the intermediary banks).
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check payment. Under the New York rule, a bank in which a check
was deposited was deemed to appoint subsequent banks handling
the check as its agent; it was, therefore, responsible to the deposi-
tor for their negligence. 115 Under the Massachusetts rule, the
depositary bank discharged its duty when it properly forwarded
the check on its path to the drawee/payor bank and had no respon-
sibility for the negligence of banks later handling the check.116 To
the extent that banks had control of the check collection process,
they naturally did what they could, usually through clauses in de-
posit agreements,117 to incorporate the Massachusetts rule into
their relationships with their depositors. Ultimately, Article 4 of
the U.C.C. adopted the Massachusetts rule.1 8 The two new laws,
of course, go the other way for EFTs and permit direct actions by
the originator ("0") against its bank ("OB") for sums which OB
can recoup by collecting down the line.
Article 4 of the U.C.C. has been criticized for representing a
banker's rather than a bank customer's view of the world. 1 9 Adop-
tion of the Massachusetts rule is one example of this
representation. Without necessarily branding Article 4 a "banker's
code," it clearly resolves most difficult issues in favor of the
banks.120
While bank representatives were a major part of the Article
4A drafting process, all issues were not resolved the banks' way
The decision to adopt the "money-back guarantee" and its appli-
cation through a New York-type rule clearly was not to the banks'
liking. Its ultimate adoption was part of the process of compromise
whereby the corporate "users" of the electronic payment system
agreed to the virtually complete elimination of their remedy of
115. Allen v. Merchants Bank, 22 Wend. 215 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1839).
116. Dorchester & Milton Bank v. New England Bank, 55 Mass. (1 Cush.) 177 (1848).
117. See R. STEFFEN, CASES ON COMMERCIAL AND INVESTMENT PAPER 155-56 (3d ed.
1964).
118. U.C.C. § 4-202(3) (1989).
119. See Beutel, The Proposed Uniform [?] Commercial Code Should Not Be
Adopted, 61 YALE L.J. 334, 335 (1952) ("Article 4 on Bank Deposits and Collections is an
unfair piece of class legislation maneuvered through the American Law Institute and the
Commission on Uniform Laws by pressure groups favoring the bankers over their
customers.").
120. The source of Article 4 is the American Bankers Association Bank Collection
Code. See U.C.C. § 4-101 comment (1989). The author of that Code has written that the
U.C.C. favors banks. See Paton, Bank Collection Legislation, 46 BANKING L.J. 508 (1929).
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consequential damages against the banks. In exchange, the banks
agreed to this version of the Massachusetts Rule in 4A.
Operation of the money-back guarantee is another illustration
of the basic difference in approach of the 4A draftsmen as con-
trasted with UNCITRAL. The latter, rooted more in the traditions
of the past, instinctively put a greater burden upon the banking
system. The former, dedicated to speed and economy, reduced that
burden.
In the 4A deliberations, it was pointed out that a bank might
be forced to effect a payment order in favor of a particular receiv-
ing bank because it was instructed to do so. 2' If that receiving
bank becomes insolvent and cannot complete the funds transfer,
why should the obedient bank be required to return money (with
interest) to one who might even have given the ill-starred instruc-
tion 9 This reasonable position resulted in a variance from the
guarantee in favor of a bank following orders when the bank, re-
ceiving a payment as a result of those orders, does not complete
the transfer and cannot return that payment because of its own
insolvency or the effect of law 122
Both 4A and the Model Law have a money-back guarantee,
but they deal with it in different ways. The problem that this dif-
ference and the liability difference creates for a sending bank is
obvious. If a New York bank accepts an EFT intended for a San
Francisco recipient, it has one type of risk; if the recipient is in
Basel, the game changes, and the New York bank is subject to po-
tentially greater damages. In pricing its services, a reasonable bank
takes account of its potential liabilities. Possibly, the New York
bank would be forced to adopt two price structures reflecting the
different risks under the two laws.
Failure To Give Notice of Rejection
Both 4A and the Model Law deem a payment order to be a
request to the receiving bank that it accept and execute that or-
der.'23 (Special rules apply to a receiving bank that is also the
beneficiary's bank, but we will not be concerned with them at this
121. See the duty of a receiving bank as prescribed by U.C.C. § 4A-302 (a)(1) (1989).
122. Id. § 4A-402(e).
123. Id. § 4A-103(1); Draft Model Law, supra note 5, art. 2(i).
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point.) Both proposed laws give the receiving bank the opportunity
to reject the order if the bank acts within an appropriate time
frame. 24 Here, the two proposals diverge and create two separate
and tortuous paths.
Under 4A, unless there is some form of contractual obligation
between a sending and receiving bank, the receiving bank accepts
the order when it executes the order. 125 If the bank decides to re-
ject the order, it must notify the sender, assuming that the sender
has enough funds on deposit with the receiver to honor the or-
der.126 If the receiving bank decides that it will reject the order but
does not give notice of rejection, it is not, however, deemed to have
accepted.127 The receiving bank incurs no liability to the sending
bank other than to pay interest to the sending bank on any with-
drawable credit balance that the sender has established with the
receiver. 28 This interest can run for a maximum period of five
days; the order is then deemed automatically canceled by opera-
tion of law. 29 Article 4A, consistent with the manner in which it
generally allocates responsibility to the sender rather than the re-
ceiver, causes the interest to stop before the end of the five day
period if the sender learns that the order was not executed. 30
Under the Model Law, again in the absence of an agreement
to the contrary, a receiving bank that decides not to accept also
must give the sending bank notice of its decision, unless "one of
the reasons is insufficient funds."' 3 This is like the 4A pattern.
Under the Model Law, however, if the receiver does not give the
notice, it accepts. 132 In this respect, the exception relating to insuf-
ficient funds on deposit was deemed significant by the UNCITRAL
Working Group. While the Model Law duty to reject, with the con-
sequence of acceptance if the notice is not given, was
124. U.C.C. § 4A-208 (1989); Draft Model Law, supra note 5, art. 5.
125. U.C.C. § 4A-209(a) (1989).
126. Id. § 4-210(a).
127. See id. § 4A-210 comment 1 ("Acceptance can occur only if the receiving bank
executes the order.").
128. Id. § 4A-210(b).
129. Id. §§ 4A-210(c) & 4A-211(d).
130. U.C.C. § 4A-210(b) (1989).
131. Draft Model Law, supra note 5, art. 5(l). But cf. U.C.C. § 4A-210(b) (1989) (spe-
cifically making the receipt of funds for the transfer irrelevant in connection with the notice
of rejection procedures).
132. Draft Model Law, supra note 5, art. 5(2)(a) (considers the failure to give a rejec-
tion notice as the equivalent of acceptance).
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acknowledged to place a heavy burden on the receiving bank, it
was also noted that the duty exists only for a bank that has re-
ceived funds and, therefore, probably has a continuing relationship
with the sending bank. The duty was widely believed to be reason-
able and within the scope of accepted bank procedures. Acceptance
in turn brings to life the duties of the acceptor to issue its own
payment order within the alloted time frame that is consistent
with the order received and accepted by it.
The consequences of failure under the Model Law to give the
notice of rejection are serious. Under 4A, as noted, there is only
the interest penalty 133 However, the Model Law imposes a duty
upon the bank to comply with the order.' If a receiving bank does
not honor its obligation to comply, it faces the following liabilities:
a. Loss of interest;
b. loss caused by a change in exchange rates;
c. expenses incurred for a new payment order and for reason-
able costs of legal representation; and
d. any other loss that may have resulted if non-execution re-
sulted from an intent to have caused it, or reckless or
knowledgeable behavior. 35
Thus, there are two theories of rejection that result in two sets
of consequences. Article 4A states that notice must be given, but
imposes no duty to act in the absence of notice;136 failure to give
notice under 4A results in relatively minor statutory consequences.
Under the Model Law, failure to give notice of rejection constitutes
an acceptance and triggers quite a significant set of penalties.
This difference presents yet another illustration of the differ-
ence in approach between 4A and the Model Law Article 4A is
designed for the modern, high speed, low cost systems. It is funda-
mentally the duty of the originator to ensure that his order is
followed and received by the beneficiary If an order is not received
when due, the originator must protect himself. He cannot relax,
accept the consequences, and then sue an erring bank as the plain-
133. See U.C.C. § 4A-210(b) (1989).
134. See Draft Model Law, supra note 5, art. 5(2).
135. Id. art. 12(l), (2) & (5).
136. The absence of a duty is consistent with the overall approach of 4A, since it is the
act of executing the payment order that constitutes the acceptance. U.C.C. § 4A-209(a)
(1989).
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tiff attempted in Evra. This scenario is more suitable for
yesterday's payment systems, including of course the checking sys-
tem. The UNCITRAL Model Law favors the originator, permitting
suits against the lender, including actions for consequential dam-
ages. The differing outlooks of the drafters of the two laws have
resulted in substantive differences like this one.
The result is that a bank will need to know which law governs
when it decides how to react to a payment order. The disparity
between the two versions is unfortunate when they govern essen-
tially identical transfers.
Security (Authentication) Procedures
Both proposals include a mechanism for protecting the integ-
rity of the funds transfer system, called a security procedure in
4A 37 and an authentication procedure in the Model Law.1"' (We
will use the 4A terminology.) This is a procedure adopted by the
banks to limit the chance that the order they are receiving was
sent by someone other than the named sender and also to increase
the likelihood that the order is correct.139 Obviously, security de-
vices may, and are expected to, differ widely among banks and
even within the same bank.
The two versions have similar approaches to security proce-
dures. The differences are, however, sufficient between them to
create risks in the event that a bank has not adapted to the partic-
ular law that will apply
The fundamental approach of 4A is that if an interloper gives
a bank a payment order in the name of a designated sender, that
order will bind the sender if the bank follows a security procedure
that is "commercially reasonable. 1 40 The sender can avoid the re-
sponsibilities of the order (that is, have the order deemed to be
unauthorized and shift the loss to the bank) by proving that it did
not provide the interloper with access ability through the cus-
137. Id. § 4A-201; see also id. § 4A-202(b) & (c).
138. Draft Model Law, supra note 5, art. 2(j).
139. A discussion of security procedures appears in D. BAKER & R. BRANDEL,"THE LAW
OF ELECTRONIC FUND TRANSFER SYSTEMS 1 18.05 (2d ed. 1988).
140. U.C.C. § 4A-202(b) (1989). The draft does not attempt to define what is commer-
cially reasonable. Rather, it prescribes that this is a question of law to be decided by the
circumstances of each particular case. Id. § 4A-202(c).
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tomer.' 4' The UNCITRAL Model Law has the same general
approach, but the customer will be bound only if it has sufficient
funds or credit in the bank to cover the order. 42 The reason for
this limitation is given in the comments to the Model Law as
follows:
[This limitation] affords a protection for originators in some coun-
tries. By limiting the amount that can be debited to an account, a
customer can limit the amount of potential loss. Such a limitation
also furnishes to a limited degree an indication that an excessively
large payment order may be in error or fraudulent.14 3
It is apparent that the foregoing rationale applies equally to
American as well as foreign funds transfers. However, a sender's
potential liability in the United States is unlimited in favor of an
intermediary bank receiving and, in turn, sending an unauthorized
order pursuant to a valid security procedure; under the Model
Law, this liability is limited to the amount on deposit. We see here
once again the tendency of 4A to favor the receiving bank in a high
speed system. The drafters believed that the receiver should be en-
titled to rely upon an order assuming that the required
information is sent. The receiving bank is obligated only to certain
prescribed duties; losses due to legal violations tend to fall upon
senders. The Model Law, rooted more deeply in the past, forces
more upon the receiving bank-here, how much cover is in place as
a measure of the sender's responsibility Speed is sacrificed for the
increased security of the sender.
Once again, it is unfortunate that the two drafting groups
could not have pooled their concepts as to how a security device
should work in order to arrive at a harmonious result.1 44
141. U.C.C. § 4A-203(a)(2) (1989).
142. Draft Model Law, supra note 5, art. 4(2)(b). Article 4A does require the receiving
bank to abide by any agreement between sender and receiver. U.C.C. § 4-302(a)(1) (1989).
Thus, the sender may by agreement restrict the overdrafts or credits that the receiver may
grant the sender; it may even limit the amount of the payment orders that the receiver is
authorized to execute. Absent such a restrictive agreement, however, there does not have to
be a credit or an agreement to give credit in favor of the sender as is required by the Model
Law.
143. Draft Model Law, supra note 5, art. 4(2) comment 7.
144. Both drafts, through their incorporation of the security procedure approach, have
the effect of reducing the potential liabilities of a bank below what they would be had a
check drawer's signature been forged and the drawee bank paid. In the United States, under
the classic rule of Price v. Neal, 97 Eng. Rep. 871 (1762), incorporated in the Uniform Com-
mercial Code in § 4-207(1)(b), a bank will typically be responsible for the unauthorized
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Duty To Follow Instructins
The Originator, 0, knowing of a good and continuing relation-
ship between Intermediary Bank Y and the Beneficiary's Bank,
BB, orders the Originator's Bank, OB to route the funds transfer
to BB through Y OB issues this instruction to Intermediary Bank
X. It happens, however, that X has a comfortable relationship with
Bank 0, believes that Bank 0 is both faster and cheaper than Y,
and, incidentally, just learned that. Y is on its regulator's problem
bank list. Acting in the best of faith, Bank X decides to route the
transfer to BB through Bank 0. May X do this? The answer is yes
under the UNCITRAL Model Law and no under draft 4A.
The basic requirement of 4A is that, when a sending bank
prescribes that a particular intermediary bank or funds transfer
system be used to move an order along, the receiving bank must
comply with the instruction received. 145 It then permits the receiv-
ing bank to vary the designated funds transfer system-but not
the designated intermediary bank-if it acts in good faith. 146 The
Model Law permits a receiving bank to ignore the sender's order
concerning use of both an intermediary bank and a funds transfer
system when "the receiving bank, in good faith, determines that it
is not feasible to follow the instruction or that following the in-
struction would cause excessive costs or delay in completion of the
credit transfer."' 47
Both drafts justify the positions taken in the comments to the
relevant sections. Article 4A stresses the relationship between
Banks Y and BB that the sender wants to utilize and acknowledges
that more leeway appears permissible in the particular funds
transfer system used. The Model Law contemplates problems
along the route of the message that should be picked up by an
intermediary sending bank.
Another way of dealing with problems anticipated by the re-
ceiving bank, incorporated into the Model Law but not 4A, enables
(but does not require) the receiving bank to contact the sender
withdrawal. U.C.C. § 4-207(1)(b) (1989). More simply, the U.C.C. also makes a drawee bank
liable for honoring any unauthorized order, which includes a forged check. Id. § 4-401.
145. U.C.C. § 4A-302(a)(1) (1989). If the receiving bank fails to comply with the terms
of the sender's order, the receiver is then subject to the liabilities prescribed by U.C.C.
section 4A-305.
146. U.C.C. § 4A-302(b) (1989).
147. Draft Model Law, supra note 5, art. 6(5).
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within the time allotted for acceptance and get instructions for the
perceived problem. 148 (Presumably such action could be taken even
without this statutory authorization and could also be taken under
the pattern of 4A.)
Unless a difference between a domestic funds transfer and an
international funds transfer can be demonstrated, the conflicting
approaches of the respective drafts cannot be justified. In the ab-
sence of ultimate accommodation, it will be necessary for a
receiving bank to know to which law a particular transfer is subject
when it perceives trouble along the path planned by the sender.
Obligation of Beneficiary's Bank
Article 4A spells out with some particularity the obligations of
a beneficiary's bank to the beneficiary upon that bank's receipt of
a payment order. The Model Law does not attempt 4A's meticu-
lous approach; when it is specific, however, the Model Law's
approach is different.
Article 4A has several provisions dealing with the relationship
between the beneficiary and his bank. It prescribes when the bene-
ficiary's bank has accepted a payment order.149 It then devotes a
full section to the obligations that the beneficiary's bank has to-
wards the beneficiary upon acceptance of the payment order. 5 ' It
states when payment is due,1" the results of failure to pay (includ-
ing the possibility of consequential damages-the only place that
such damages appear in the Article), 152 the beneficiary's bank's
duty to give notice to the beneficiary, 153 the form of notice,' 54 pen-
alties for failure to give notice"55 and opportunities to waive the
requirements."'
148. See id. (last sentence).
149. U.C.C. § 4A-209(b) (1989). This event is also identified in Model Law Article 6(2),
but with considerably less particularity.
150. U.C.C. § 4A-404 (1989).
151. Id. § 4A-404(a).
152. Id.
153. Id. § 4A-404(b).
154. Id.
155. U.C.C. § 4A-404(b) (1989).
156. Id. § 4A-404(c).
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The Model Law also prescribes when the beneficiary's bank
accepts a payment order. 157 The events causing acceptance are not,
however, consistent with 4A.158 The Model Law does provide that,
upon acceptance, the beneficiary's bank is liable to the benefi-
ciary 159 The liability is designed to be discharged in a particular
manner. As of this writing, two possible variants are given.160
Whichever variant is ultimately selected, however, the manner of
settling the obligation of the beneficiary's bank to the beneficiary
will be handled differently from the provisions of Article 4A.' 6 '
Since the total presentation of this matter is handled one way in
Article 4A and another way in the Model Law, it is hard to be
precise about how many differences there are and how significant
they will be in practice.162
The Model Law also provides for a bank's liabilities for failure
to execute properly in favor of the beneficiary 163 These liabilities
may include consequential damages. The beneficiary bank's liabil-
ity may also include consequential damages under 4A, but the
prerequisites differ.164 Liability under the Model Law, depending
upon the nature of the beneficiary's bank's dereliction, may be in
favor of the original sender or the beneficiary 165 Article 4A pro-
vides for liabilities in favor of the beneficiary only 166
The analysis is, once again, muddied by the effects of Federal
Reserve Board Regulation CC that preempts state law (including
157. Draft Model Law, supra note 5, art. 6(2).
158. The tests are lengthy, worded differently and filled with differences. For example,
Model Law Article 7(2) requires a rejection notice to be given by the execution date, while
4A requires it by the next day. See Draft Model Law, supra note 5, art. 7(2); U.C.C. §§ 4A-
209, 4A-210 (1989). Under Model Law Article 7(1)(d), acceptance occurs upon notice to the
beneficiary that he has the right to withdraw funds. Under U.C.C. Article 4A, notice that
the order has been received suffices for acceptance. U.C.C. § 4A-209(b)(3) (1989).
159. Draft Model Law, supra note 5, art. 8(4).
160. See id.
161. For example, one of the possible variants of Model Law Article 8(4) divides those
obligations between cases where the beneficiary has and cases where it does not have an
account with its bank. Article 4A deals with this particular approach but is not based on it.
162. Is putting funds at disposal (Draft Model Law, supra note 5, art. 8) the same as
paying (U.C.C. § 4A-404(a) (1989)); is a requirement to notify on the day of receipt (Draft
Model Law, supra note 5, arts. 8 & 9) significantly different from a requirement to notify by
midnight of the next day (U.C.C. § 4A-404 (1989))?
163. Draft Model Law, supra note 5, art. 12(4).
164. See U.C.C. § 4A-404(a) (1989).
165. Draft Model Law, supra note 5, art. 12(4).
166. See U.C.C. § 4A-404 (1989).
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Article 4A, assuming, as we do, its adoption as state law). 6 7 Regu-
lation D generally prescribes the relationship in an EFT of the
beneficiary's bank and the beneficiary It is sufficient to observe
that the Model Law's structure is even more out of sync with Reg-
ulation CC than with Article 4A. For example, Regulation CC does
not allow consequential damages' while both 4A (in limited cir-
cumstances) and the Model Law do.
This may well be an area where a United States lawyer should
tread lightly The relationship between a bank and its depositary
customer is likely to be subject more to the niceties of local law
than are some other aspects of the funds transfer system. Some
portions of the Model Law are likely to be the result of an appreci-
ation of these niceties. On the other hand, one has difficulty in
appreciating that such issues as notice to the beneficiary or times
of transfer cannot be overridden by a universal Model Law The
observation must be repeated, however, that a beneficiary's bank
will have particular difficulty in untangling the two legal skeins of
the different laws.
Cancellation and Amendment
1. Banks other than the beneficiary's bank.-The times
within which payment orders may be cancelled or amended after
they are received by banks other than the beneficiary's bank differ
between the two drafts.169 They start in the same place; cancella-
tion and amendment are effective as to banks that are not the
beneficiary's bank if received within a reasonable time before the
receiving bank has retransmitted the order.170 Under 4A, the re-
167. See infra text accompanying notes 205-06.
168. 12 C.F.R. § 229.21 (1990).
169. Actually, U.C.C. section 4A-211 speaks in terms of "Cancellation and Amend-
ment"- the Model Law, in Article 10, deals only with "Revocation." For present purposes,
we will assume that this difference is without substantive significance. The previous draft of
the Model Law, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.IV/WP.41 (1989), phrased the relevant
section (Article 8(1)) in terms of "revocation and amendment." The current draft phrases it
merely as "revocation." We will assume that the ability to revoke includes the ability to
amend and that no substantive change was intended.
170. It is not clear whether the rule espoused by both laws is consistent with the re-
sults of Middle East Banking v. State St. Bank Int'l, 821 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1987), where a
stop order was received by a bank in time to stop the transfer, but the transfer was in fact
effected through employee error. See Middle East Banking, 821 F.2d at 900, 903 (Funds
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quirement is phrased in terms of acceptance' 7' and in the Model
Law in terms of execution, 172 but the effect is much the same since
under 4A acceptance occurs only through execution.'73
The differences occur after the statement of the underlying
rule. Under 4A, a receiving bank may be forced to accept a cancel-
lation or amendment after having accepted an order only if the
receiving bank agrees or if there is a funds transfer rule to that
effect.1 74 (The receiving bank must also be able to cancel or amend
the order it has in turn given.) 175
Under the Model Law, a different pattern is prescribed. The
receiving bank is obligated by the statute to notify the next bank
in line of the revocation "as promptly as possible under the cir-
cumstances.' 7 6 If it fails to get to the next bank in line in time to
stop the transfer, it appears that the revocation is simply ineffec-
tive and the original order remains effective. If, however, it fails to
act "as promptly as possible under the circumstances" and the
transfer is for that reason not cancelled, the sending bank is re-
lieved of its responsibility to pay the receiving bank the amount of
the transfer (or, if it has already paid, it may get its money back);
and the receiving bank retains its liability to the next bank in line.
Under 4A, this burden on the receiving bank simply does not exist.
2. The beneficiary's bank.-If the receiving bank is the bene-
ficiary's bank, the rules of the two drafts again diverge.
Cancellation or amendment 177 is again valid if made reasonably in
advance of acceptance. 7" After acceptance by the beneficiary's
bank, there are different rules. The Model Law does not permit
were voluntarily returned to the sender, but the receiver was nevertheless found responsible
for what it did with the stop order it had received.).
171. U.C.C. § 4A-211(b) (1989). The concept of acceptance rather than execution is
undoubtedly used because 4A groups together cancellations given to intermediary and bene-
ficiary banks; the latter banks have no concept of re-execution.
172. Draft Model Law, supra note 5, art. 10(i).
173. U.C.C. § 4A-209(a) (1989).
174. Id. § 4A-211(c).
175. Id. § 4A-211(c)(1).
176. Draft Model Law, supra note 5, art. 10(4).
177. We continue to assume that the Model Law applies to amendment as well as to
revocation.
178. U.C.C. § 4A-211((b) (1989); Draft Model Law, supra note 5, art. 10(2).
7591991]
Alabama Law Review
revocation by the beneficiary's bank after its acceptance. 1 9 Article
4A requires either an agreement by the beneficiary's bank to that
effect or a funds transfer rule authorizing cancellation after accept-
ance.180  4A has additional requirements for cancellation or
amendment after acceptance with respect to a payment order ac-
cepted by the beneficiary's bank.181
The question dealt with here is at what point in the transfer
process is an act sufficiently accomplished that it may not be un-
done through a stop payment order or some other procedure
provided in the Code. The general approach is that recipients of
electronic funds transfers tend to treat them as the rough
equivalent of cash. Therefore, they should be irreversible as early
as possible.'82 Both drafts honor this principle, although in some-
what different ways.
Some of the foregoing details are significant, and some are not.
They all, however, subject a receiving bank to tests as to how to
respond to requests to cancel or amend. Consistent with its general
approach, the Model Law subjects receiving banks to a greater re-
sponsibility for surveillance. To the extent that the tests differ
when applied to funds transfers in the domestic as contrasted with
the international market, they place burdens upon the banking
system that may be arduous and probably could have been
avoided.
179. For this purpose, the basic principle of Model Law Article 10(l) requiring revoca-
tion before acceptance is not modified. That this result is intended is confirmed by comment
10. See Draft Model Law, supra note 5, art. 10 comment 10.
180. U.C.C. § 4A-211(c) (1989).
181. Id. § 4A-211(c)(2). Section 4A-211(c)(2) provides as follows:
[C]ancellation or amendment is not effective [in this situation] unless the order was
issued in execution of an unauthorized payment order, or because of a mistake by a
sender in the funds transfer which resulted in the issuance of a payment order (i)
that is a duplicate of a payment order previously issued by the sender, (ii) that orders
payment to a beneficiary not entitled to receive payment from the originator, or (iii)
that orders payment in an amount greater than the amount the beneficiary was enti-
tled to recover from the originator.
Id.
182. In Delbrueck & Co. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 609 F.2d 1047 (2d Cir.
1979), payments were considered irrevocable when made. The rules of the CHIPS system
were supportive of this result. Notice to stop a transfer that might have been received by a
bank minutes before it executed that transfer was deemed ineffective. Note that under Arti-
cle 4A, funds transfer system rules will continue to govern and so Delbrueck would probably
come out the same way and for the same reason. As we shall see in Part IV the Model Law
does not deal with funds transfer system rules. Under the principles of the Model Law,
however, Delbrueck would probably be decided to achieve the same result.
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Par Payment
Article 4A and the UNCITRAL Model Law contain different
provisions as to whether the parties to a funds transfer can expect
what has traditionally been called "par payment." That is, can the
recipient of a funds transfer, assuming that all goes well, expect to
receive the same amount that was sent by the originator, or can
parties along the way skim off sums for their services, thereby re-
ducing the amount that will ultimately be received at the other
end?
Today, one can generally assume that his check will be paid in
the amount for which it was written. This was not always so.
Banks in the collection process had for years charged for their ser-
vices so that check payees regularly received something less than
the face amount of the check. The goal of what we now call "par
payment" was achieved only after considerable pressure by the
Federal Reserve System that was generally supported by federal
legislation. 83 The legislation eliminated exchange charges in na-
tional banks and in state banks that were voluntary members of
the federal reserve system. In the face of this pressure, exchange
charges by nonmember state banks "gradually withered away 1814
The absence of such charges has become consistent with bank-
ing practice since checks are generally handled by banks that have
some form of correspondent relationship with each other. Thus,
the charges that must necessarily attend the functions of handling
and paying checks can be satisfied through the ebb and flow of
interbank balances and other relationships. 8 5
This may be less true when electronic payments are the me-
dium of funds transfer. The system of payment through electronic
means has not achieved the level of maturity of the check system.
Banks may receive payment orders from banks with whom they
183. The story of the evolution from non-par payments to today's scheme, the support
of the Federal Reserve System and the place of state legislation, including the Bank Collec
tion Code, is told in Scott, The Risk Fixers, 91 HARV. L. REV. 737 (1978) and Wyatt, The
Par Clearance Controversy, 30 VA. L. REv. 361 (1944).
184. Rubin, Uniformity, Regulation, and Federalization of State Law: Some Lessons
from the Payment System, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1251, 1256 (1989).
185. The issue has recently arisen again with a proposal of the Federal Reserve Board
concerning check clearing. See 53 Fed. Reg. 24,093 (1988) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. §
229.36 (proposed June 27, 1988). Appreciating the problem, the Board has deferred action
on the proposal. See 54 Fed. Reg. 5495 (1989).
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have no continuing relationship; they may also handle electronic
funds transfers where an existing correspondent relationship is
not, or not yet, in tune with the needs of electronic payments. For
these reasons, the draftsmen of 4A had originally engineered a sys-
tem within which correspondent banks might have creamed off
their various charges from transferred funds as they passed
through, as in the manner of non-par payments as they existed in
the early part of this century Section 4A-302(d), however, now
provides that this may not be done unless the sender specifically
gives an instruction allowing this. Since the original sender is the
originator of the funds transfer, this means that par payment will
be achieved in all cases in the manner of the checking system, un-
less the originator provides for something different when he starts
the process.
The ability of the originator to give an order that will result in
payment to the beneficiary of a lesser amount raises the question
of whether the underlying obligation will be satisfied. That is, if
originator ("0") owes beneficiary ("B") $1,000,000 and authorizes
that transfer charges may be deducted, will payment to B of, say,
$999,990 ($10 having been deducted along the way by an interme-
diary bank pursuant to O's instructions) satisfy the debt?
4A solves the problem by saying, first, that the debt is satis-
fied by the lower payment. It then, however, adds that the debt
will not be satisfied if B demands the $10 from 0 and 0 refuses to
pay it.1 86
The UNCITRAL Model Law takes a different approach. It
provides for non-par payment without the authority of the origina-
tor.187 It also requires 0 to pay B the amount of the charges to
satisfy the underlying obligation. Apparently, if 0 does not pay B,
the obligation is still discharged but B has a claim, perhaps in con-
tract, against 0.188
186. See U.C.C. § 4A-406(c) (1989).
187. The text is not specific on this allowance although a fair reading of Model Law
Article 14 would seem to authorize it. Any ambiguity on this point is clarified, however, by
comment 9. See Draft Model Law, supra note 5, art. 14 comment 9.
188. The Model Law provides:
If one or more intermediary banks have deducted charges from the amount of the
credit transfer, the obligation is discharged by the amount of those charges in addi-
tion to the amount of the payment order as received by the beneficiary's bank. Unless
otherwise agreed, the debtor is bound to compensate the creditor for the amount of
those charges.
Draft Model Law, supra note 5, art. 14(3).
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The approach of the two proposed laws may probably be va-
ried by an agreement of the parties that a specific sum-and
nothing less-must be received by the beneficiary for the underly-
ing obligation to be satisfied. Section 4A-501 provides a general
authority to vary rights and obligations by agreement.'89
The attitude of the Model Law to variations by agreement is
not yet clearly articulated. Again, the two drafts differ.
IV SYSTEM RULES: AN ARTICLE 4A COVERAGE NOT ADDRESSED
BY THE MODEL LAW
Article 4A is the product of some three and one-half years of
work. Its concepts, construction and drafting were conceived and
reviewed by some of the leading specialists available in electronic
funds transfers. Its resolution is a carefully honed set of com-
promises among implementers of funds transfers-principally
banks-and the users of those transfers-principally commercial
enterprises (and, incidentally, also banks).
A critic who now comes to the scene arrives too late to appre-
ciate the process of creation. Depending upon one's particular
orientation, one will probably disagree with various of the policy
positions taken. Since many of those positions represent com-
promises rather than anyone's ideal resolution, some disagreement
with the final result is not only appropriate but almost inevitable.
It would, however, be difficult to assert that legal areas of conse-
quence to those involved in electronic funds transfers were
ignored. 9" The experts who guided the drafting knew where the
problems lay and attempted to deal with them.
This cannot be said for the UNCITRAL Model Law. Experts
rubbed shoulders with neophytes during the drafting process, and
the results of this mix of knowledge permeates the current draft. It
is not insignificant that Article 4A contains 38 sections, the Model
189. As 4A is part of the U.C.C., the general authority provided in U.C.C. section 1-
102(3) to vary the provisions of the U.C.C. by agreement apply. U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (1989). It
is unclear what subsection 4A-501(a) adds. However, the latter subsection does repeat the
statutory pattern already established for variation by agreement found in subsection 4-
103(1). See id. §§ 4-103(1) & 4A-501(a).
190. The draftsmen were sufficiently modest to acknowledge the existence of "gaps
that may be present in Article 4A." Id. § 4A-501 comment 1.
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Law only 12. (And the Model Law does not attempt to squeeze
more into each section.)
In this portion of the Article I will examine one significant
area, namely the relationship of payment system rules with statu-
tory law, that was dealt with in 4A but not in the Model Law
Payments through electronic means are frequently conducted
by groups or associations of banks, frequently called nets or, some-
what more formally, funds transfer systems.'91 These systems
operate through sets of rules.19 2 So long as there is no controlling
statutory law in force, these rules operate as contracts among the
participating banks. The effect of these contracts upon third par-
ties not part of the system is less clear. 9 The relationship of these
rules with statutory law became an obvious issue as 4A and the
Model Law came into focus.
Article 4A deals with this issue. It specifies a general rule for
its relationship with a standard funds transfer system, the most
significant of these systems being the Clearing House Interbank
Payment System ("CHIPS"). It also deals with its relationship
with the Automatic Clearing House System, whether operated by
the Federal Reserve System' or by an association of banks.'95 Ar-
ticle 4A also makes clear that, however standard rules of federal
preemption may handle the problem, not only Federal Reserve
System regulations but also operating circulars of the separate
Federal Reserve Banks supersede any inconsistency in 4A. Thus,
funds transfers through FedWire will, from the viewpoint of Arti-
cle 4A, be handled consistently with transfers through privately
operated systems.'96
This approach demonstrates the modernity and reality of 4A.
Given the dominance of electronic payment systems in today's fi-
nancial structure, an appropriate relationship between the rules of
191. The use of such systems was essentially impelled as a result of Independent
Bankers Ass'n of Am. v. Smith, 534 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 862 (1976),
which held that an electronic terminal was not a branch of a bank if it was not owned or
rented by that bank. Thus, the practice grew of one bank utilizing terminals owned by other
banks or by entities separate from the bank.
192. See D. BAKER & R. BRANDEL, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC FUND TRANSFER SYSTEMS
19.06 (2d ed. 1988).
193. Id. 19.06(1).
194. U.C.C. § 4A-501(b)(ii) (1989). See td. § 4-501 comment 2.
195. U.C.C. § 4A-501(b)(i) (1989).
196. Id. § 4A-107. This form of transfer is known as Fedwire and is governed by Regu-
lation J of the Federal Reserve System, 12 C.F.R. § 210 (1990).
764 [Vol. 42:2:723
Strange Bedfellows
those systems and an umbrella statute is essential. The recognition
of those rules as overwhelming the statutory language is actually
not a new idea in the Uniform Commercial Code. It reflects the
approach of the U.C.C. where usages of trade can be found to em-
body an agreement and stand alongside the traditional rules of
offer, acceptance and consideration. 197 Article 4A looks to the fu-
ture and is a fresh and original approach to statutory drafting.
The Model Law does not deal with such issues. It is not that
funds transfer systems are unknown outside the United States.
Great Britain has the CHAPS system, France utilizes the Sagit-
taire system, Japan has the ZENGIN system, Singapore has the
SHIFT system, and Hong Kong has the CHATS system.' In this
sense, the Model Law is old-fashioned, even more traditional, than
4A. It is written more in the manner of the standard law governing
payment by check. Obviously the funds transfer systems are
known to the drafters of the Model Law. Also known is the fact
that those systems have their own rules which play a part in funds
transfers and will affect such transfers after the Model Law be-
comes effective. 99 At this time, however, the relationship between
the Model Law and those rules does not form part of the Law's
structure.
V SPECULATING ABOUT THE FUTURE
Form of Passage
We have assumed throughout this Article the passage in the
United States of both Article 4A and the Model Law That is, they
will coexist and the conflicts between them must be resolved. Here,
we will both refine and question that assumption.
197. U.C.C. § 1-201(3) (1989). This approach to contract law is discussed in Mooney,
Old Kontract Principles and Karl's New Kode; an Essay on the Jurisprudence of Our New
Commercial Law, 11 VILL. L. REV. 213 (1966). The influence of CHIPS rules on the law was
demonstrated in Delbrueck & Co. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 609 F.2d 1047 (2d
Cir. 1974).
198. B. CRAWFORD, INTERNATIONAL MONEY TRANSFERS (Singapore Confs. on Int'l Bus.
Law: Current Devs. in Int'l Banking & Corp. Fin. Operations, Aug. 18-20, 1988).
199. See, e.g., Draft Legal Guide on Electronic Funds Transfer U.N. GAOR, U.N.
Doc. A/CN9/266/Add.2 (1985) (which makes reference to transfer systems and. their rules).
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First, Article 4A has been and is being enacted as state law
and as part of the Uniform Commercial Code."' The Model Law
(again assuming that it is adopted by any legislature) may become
the law of one or more states in the United States; it may be en-
acted-more probably will be enacted-as federal law 201 There is,
of course, no indication that Congress has any concern with the
Model Law In either case, however, its relationship with enacted
4A will have to be established.
Should it also become state law, the Model Law contains its
own area of coverage, and whether a particular transaction falls
under 4A or the Model Law will be a continuing issue. Article 4A is
not, by its own terms, restricted to domestic transactions. It re-
quires only that a key ingredient of the funds transfer be located
in the state which has passed the law 202 (To the extent that the
parties have agreed that 4A shall govern, even that degree of con-
nection is not required.20 s)
The most rational correspondence of 4A and the Model Law
would be for the Model Law to control in the specific areas for
which it is designed. That is, it would govern a funds transfer
where "the originator's bank and the beneficiary's bank are in dif-
ferent countries. 20 4 Even if, for such a transaction, the connection
with a state of the United States were sufficient to put 4A into
play, controlling law would be the Model Law 206 Article 4A would,
however, govern the remainder of EFTs to which, by its own terms,
it is applicable and to which the Model Law is inapplicable. (This
200. There is an occasional suggestion that 4A should be enacted as federal law in
order to bring its effects at one time and in a uniform manner to the entire country.
Whatever the beneficial effects of such enactment might be, we will assume that there is no
particular political force seeking this result and that 4A will follow the remainder of the
Uniform Commercial Code as state law.
201. The mandate given by the United Nations to UNCITRAL in connection with its
funds transfer endeavors is broad enough to enable UNCITRAL to write a domestic as well
as an international law.
202. U.C.C. § 4A-507(a) (1989).
203. Id. § 4A-507(b).
204. Draft Model Law, supra note 5, art. 1(1).
205. Such a reading would be in conformity with general principles of statutory con-
struction. "Where one statute deals with a subject in general terms, and another deals with
a part of the same subject in a more detailed way the latter will prevail. " 2A N.
SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 51.00 (4th ed. 1984) (1984 rev. of SUTHER-
LAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION).
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conforms to the standard reading of statutes: the more specific
controls the more general.)
To the extent that banks or users must analyze the applicable
statute for each transaction, inconsistencies between the two will
be particularly troubling. Issues of differing responsibility and lia-
bility will be raised and related matters of pricing must be
addressed. In grey areas, issues of coverage may have to be ad-
dressed by the courts.
If the Model Law is enacted as federal law, the issues will be
similar but shaded differently Federal law preempts state law and
thus the areas that the Model Law covers will preempt conflicting
state law. This, however, would not seem to create a different re-
sult from that which would occur even if both were state law and
the approach recommended above were adopted.206
If the Model Law is ultimately adopted by the Senate as a
treaty of the United States, the result is once again essentially the
same. Treaties are federal law and, as such, preempt state law. The
areas governed by 4A (state law) and the Model Law (federal law)
would have to be worked out; areas of inconsistency would be ruled
by the Model Law, and the problems we have outlined would
persist.
The foregoing paragraphs are, of course, all speculation. If one
were to select today the most likely pattern of passage, it would be
4A as state law and the Model Law not at all. To the extent that
United States bankers have any awareness of the Model Law, their
reaction is one of almost unallayed dismay They deem it without
recognition of the true nature of EFTs;0 7 they consider that, where
tough issues exist, the Model Law selects the wrong answers; they
consider the Model Law to be a surface approach to what 4A ad-
dresses in depth.208 Thus, we may fairly assume that in anything
similar to its present form, the Model Law will not become United
States law at all. But does this mean that the problem we have
been examining, of the relationship between the two laws, will not
exist?
206. This would be the case even if the Model Law were ultimately promulgated by
the Federal Reserve System in the form of a regulation. Again, I am not suggesting that
such an event is being considered.
207. See supra note 8. I have previously noted the different focus of the drafters of 4A
from that of the Model Law drafters.
208. One banker has called the Model Law a "poor man's 4A."
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Unfortunately, the problem will not go away so simply The
Model Law may well (and on this subject we will not attempt any
prediction) be adopted as the law of foreign states. Funds transfers
emanating from, or even merely passing through, the United States
could then easily become subject to its terms as they touch adopt-
ing foreign states. The problem then becomes one of conflicts of
laws-whose law governs-and that turns largely on the law of the
country where the lawsuit is brought. 09 Inconsistencies between
the two laws can still be troubling, creating at the international
level the issues of underlying responsibilities and resulting liabili-
ties with which this Article has been concerned. Anything less than
consistency between the two draft laws should be avoided.
One Person's Opinion
The author here suggests that, given the constant and continu-
ing mix of domestic and foreign funds transfers handled by the
major (and even the minor) United States banks, while it is not
inconceivable that 4A and the Model Law could coexist as guiding
law-one for some transfers, the other for the remainder--this pos-
sibility is undesirable at best and, at worst, is an expensive
travesty of financial regulation.21 0
Possible Solutions
We cannot be certain that this potential legislative collision
will occur. The problem does clearly exist on the horizon and those
in the trenches must try and avert any unfortunate confrontation.
As we noted at the start of this Article, 4A is essentially com-
pleted.211 The most effective effort, therefore, is clearly to try and
fashion the Model Law as closely as possible to the image of 4A.
One has no reason to be optimistic that this will occur (subject
perhaps to the idea in the last paragraph of this section). The rest
209. See Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co., I Lloyd's Rep. 259 (Q.B.
1988); Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. (No. 2), 1 Lloyd's
Rep. 608 (Q.B. 1989).
210. See E. CARROLL, J. DANFORTH, C. GOLEMBE & P LAUB, THE BURDEN OF BANK REG-
ULATION (Study Prepared for American Bankers Association, Aug. 31, 1989).
211. I say essentially because revisions can always be made. In addition, states may
adopt 4A in a nonuniform manner. While this is discouraged by the Commissioners, it does
happen, both upon initial enactment and through modifications from time to time.
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of the world has no dedication to the United States' 4A or to the
concepts of the American bankers, users and related institutions
such as clearing houses and the funds transfer systems who are
largely responsible for it.
One possible method of avoiding conflict is to attempt to slow
4A down in the state legislatures in order to await the Model Law
as the appropriate statute.212 Assuming that the Model Law does
ultimately become federal United States law, this would achieve
uniformity among the United States and the rest of the world. It
does create problems: principally, how would we approach EFTs
that are entirely domestic in nature and therefore not within the
coverage of the Model Law 213 The United States banking inter-
ests are convinced that the present absence of statutory law and
the suspense created by cases like Evra and others that are sub
judice are dangerous and intolerable. We undoubtedly need law in
the short term and cannot wait for the U.N. to complete its ele-
phantine process of legislative gestation.
If the foregoing course were taken, might we amend the Model
Law so that it covers domestic EFTs within the United States in
addition to its present international coverage? This possibility
would first require a new study to see whether it is appropriate for
that purpose. We would undoubtedly encounter its general inferi-
ority to 4A and start to extract from 4A to remedy the deficiencies.
This could lead anywhere.
An alternative course of action is to try and discourage both
the completion of the Model Law by UNCITRAL and its approval
by the U.N. Aside from some minor embarrassments1 4 for those
who toiled from this country to produce the Model Law, there are
problems in this approach. Primarily, we would be left without
firm legal guideposts in the international arena to govern EFTs.
The application of local law would remain uncertain under con-
flicts of law principles and we might find ourselves back in the
clouds of Evra.
212. In light of the fast pace with which states have been adopting Article 4A, this is
not likely a viable alternative.
213. See supra text accompanying notes 7-8 for the Model Law's underlying concept
of internationality.
214. Anticipating trouble down the road, the United States delegation to UNCITRAL
has already informed the group in no uncertain terms that the draft it was producing would
almost certainly be unacceptable in-the United States.
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One possible solution would be a Federal Reserve Board regu-
lation adopting the Model Law or portions of it as applicable to
United States EFTs. The Federal Reserve has broad powers to reg-
ulate the money transfer system.2 15 It has used these powers to
promulgate its Regulation J216 which covers the checking system as
it is affected by the Federal Reserve clearing operation and the
EFT operation known as FedWire. It is clear that this Regulation
preempts state law, including the law of the Uniform Commercial
Code.21 More recently, based upon authority contained in the Ex-
pedited Funds Availability Act2'1 the Federal Reserve has made
massive changes in the check collection process generally and to
that extent again preempted the U.C.C.21 9
The process of what has been termed "federalization"-that is
the drawing of state law into federal enactment-seems to be be-
coming more acceptable.220 It would seem only a further step in
that process for the Federal Reserve to take two new and incom-
patible statutory approaches and rewrite them into a federal
regulation that would become the governing law of the area. Such a
regulation, to achieve the consistency that we perceive as welcome,
would at the very least have to be consistent with the Model Law
We suspect that a move of this nature would be as distasteful to
the Federal Reserve as it would be to the NCCUSL, which is com-
mitted by philosophy to the vitality of state law Furthermore, as
we have previously indicated,221 the Model Law is generally
deemed inferior as a legal guide to 4A and its adoption as the
model should probably be avoided. It is, however, a solution.
At this time, before the Model Law is accorded the UN impri-
matur, the intelligent approach would still seem to be a continuing
effort to amend it in the direction of 4A. The approach has, of
course, been repeatedly pursued to no avail. One possible alterna-
215. This is based upon various provisions of the Federal Reserve Act, principally 12
U.S.C. §§ 342, 248(i), 248(o) & 360 (1988).
216. 12 C.F.R. § 210 (1988).
217. See Wells Fargo Bank v. Hartford Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 484 F Supp. 817 (D.
Conn. 1980).
218. Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, Title VI, 101
Stat. 635 (1987), codified as Expedited Funds Availability Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4010
(1988).
219. See Regulation CC, 12 C.F.R. § 229 (1990).
220. See Rubin, supra note 184, at 1256.
221. See supra text accompanying note 208.
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tive has, in a sense, actually grown out of the different foci we have
already mentioned between the drafters of 4A and those of the
Model Law.222 If, indeed, the major attention of the 4A group has
been on high speed, low cost, high volume EFTs and the attention
of the Model Law group has been on a "broader" set of EFTs 22 3
why not divide the Model Law into two parts; one would be consis-
tent with 4A, the other not. The consistent part would cover the
high speed transfers that are m fact the main concern of the
United States interested parties. Transfers over such systems as
CHIPS, CHAPS and other similar systems would be governed by a
harmonious body of law and everything else (whatever that may
turn out to be) will live under legal systems that may present
problems for the banks, the parties and the courts, but would
probably not be destructive in their impact. This approach
presents difficult drafting problems and may ultimately achieve
the approval of no one. At this time, it does, however, suggest an-
other way out.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is simplistic and trite to agree that the world is growing
smaller. We do, however, still frequently find ourselves working
with the ideas of the larger world of yesterday when dealing with
the problems of the smaller world of tomorrow. The two drafting
processes that concern us here are illustrative. As we have previ-
ously indicated, it makes little difference to a New York bank
whether it sends an EFT to San Francisco or to London. Yet, two
law-authoring bodies have been at work on separate laws that are
designed to govern the two transactions separately We know that,
should they both be enacted, there will be trouble. Yet, each pro-
ceeds in essential independence of the other.
Insofar as the insular attitude of the United Nations is con-
cerned, it has been suggested that with the United States century-
old movement to unify commercial law behind us,224 we are both
222. See supra text accompanying note 8.
223. I will not attempt to identify what that broader group encompasses.
224. The first Uniform Law written by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws was the Negotiable Instruments Law which became a Uniform Law in
1896 and was adopted by all states. The major unification of commercial law was accom-
plished by the Uniform Commercial Code which became a Uniform'Law in 1951. This may
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more sensitive to the problems engendered by separate legal sys-
tems and more attuned to the possibilities of unification. 225 One is
harder put to justify the disjointure of the United States
Commissioners.
However, we face the future with optimism.
be recent enough to make even the United States less than fully receptive to the possibili-
ties of international private law.
225. This thought was probably original with Professor John Spanogle of George
Washington Law School, an American representative to UNCITRAL.
